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ABSTRACT  
   
While scan-based trading (SBT) is a growing trend in the retail industry, evidence 
suggests that many SBT initiatives have contributed only to the retailers’ bottom line at 
the suppliers’ expense. This research attempts to disclose some of the causes of SBT 
failure as a collaborative inventory management initiative and identify SBT’s integrative 
potential using both positivistic and normative research methodologies.  
In the first chapter, SBT contracts are analyzed through the lens of Agency 
Theory. By focusing on unique inventory ownership and risks considerations resulting 
from retailers managing supplier-owned inventory without bearing the cost of inventory 
shrinkage, the effect of SBT on inventory shrinkage is examined empirically using a data 
set from a packaged bakery manufacturer. The results show that inventory shrinkage 
tends to be higher under SBT contracts compared to traditional vendor-managed 
inventory (VMI) contracts. The study highlights a potential loss in efficiency in food 
supply chains reflected in higher shrinkage under SBT contracts.      
The second chapter aims to identify conditions under which SBT contracts could 
be mutually beneficial for retailers and suppliers. Using stylized game theoretic models 
involving a retailer and a supplier of a product with limited shelf life, the study finds that, 
while inventory shrinkage may be amplified under SBT contracts compared to VMI 
contracts due to the decreased retailer’s incentive to manage inventory at the store, SBT 
could help suppliers minimize inventory overage and underage under high demand 
uncertainty. The integrative potential for SBT contracts, thus, lies in the trade-off 
between inventory shrinkage and forecasting accuracy.  
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In the third paper, the role of bargaining power on the performance of SBT 
contracts is examined. Based on the bargaining literature, it is hypothesized that 
perceptions of bargaining power can be reshaped in the bargaining process through 
concession tactics. The results of a negotiation experiment show that, while powerful 
retailers do tend to have the upper hand in negotiating SBT contracts, weak suppliers 
could ameliorate or even overcome retailer power by offering services as a concession in 
a way that the product-service bundle improves the value of their offerings in the eyes of 
the retailers. 
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PREFACE  
Supply chain collaboration has been one of the hottest topics in the past few 
decades. More recently, manufacturers and retailers have started to revolutionize the way 
they work together to improve profitability and better control costs in their supply chains. 
Traditionally, clear boundaries existed between manufacturers and retailers since the firm 
owning the inventory hold it at its site as the goods flow in the supply chain. However, 
the borders have become blurred as the reassignment of their roles and responsibilities 
under new collaborative initiatives has resulted in decoupling of inventory ownership 
from control (Lee and Whang, 2008). While such flexible reallocation of inventory 
ownership, location, and control responsibility has certainly led to great improvements in 
efficiencies for some partners, many of such initiatives have either failed or failed to 
provide mutual benefits (Benavides, De Eskinazis and Swan, 2012). One of the latest 
collaborative initiatives, particularly popular in the food retailing sector, is scan-based 
trading (SBT). In SBT contracts, vendors practically own the inventory supplied to 
retailers’ stores until it is scanned at the stores’ points of sale because they receive 
payment from the retailers for the products in inventory once the products are sold to 
consumers. While SBT contracts could deliver some real value to the participating firms, 
evidence suggests that the contracts may arise from an abuse of retailer power and could 
result in uneven benefits. 
My interest in inventory waste as a supply chain inefficiency arising from SBT 
contracts has started when I interviewed a regional dairy supplier, Shamrock Foods. In an 
ideal world, “shrink” or loss of inventory between suppliers’ delivery and customers’ 
checkout at a store should be a small fraction of the total inventory supplied to the store. 
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However, Shamrock Foods reported an average shrink of 9%, which seemed to be 
unusually high level of operational inefficiency. The operations manager I interviewed 
added that such a high level of shrink is a result of SBT contracts they have adopted 
recently and the average shrink should be around 2%. Sadly, he did not have any hard 
data to prove his statement. When margins between milk suppliers and retailers are 
typically 2% or lower, a rise in shrink of such magnitude could mean the difference 
between a survival or death. I decided to investigate whether SBT contracts do create 
inefficiencies reflected in inventory shrink and how we can overcome the issue. 
Food retailing sector is a particularly relevant field to study the effectiveness of emerging 
contractual forms because power imbalance between producers and retailers has been 
chronic in this sector. While there are thousands of producers for the supply of most 
commodities, the number of retailers is far fewer. Since the late 1990s, food retailers 
have been consolidating as a strategic response to mega grocers such as Walmart and 
such structural imbalance between food suppliers and retailers has influenced prices for 
food products (Calvin et al. 2001). With declining retail margins and advances in 
information technologies in more recent years, retailer-supplier power asymmetry has 
manifested in some insidious ways (Ganesan et al. 2009). Beyond the cost and fairness 
issues associated with asymmetric market power, inefficiencies in food supply chain 
result in waste. Whether the product passes its expiration date, destroyed in handling, or 
lost, improper inventory management resulting from misaligned incentives among the 
supply chain partners leads to inventory that does not end up in consumers' homes, nor 
contributes to suppliers' profit. Therefore, the trend toward SBT contracts and potential 
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misalignment of incentives could represent an additional source of food waste, at a time 
of unprecedentedly high food waste.  
In this dissertation, I seek to investigate this rapidly-growing business practice 
that, if properly used, may benefit both food producers and retailers, but if not, may 
represent a huge step back for food supply chain in a generation. The three essays 
included in this dissertation investigate this phenomenon from an empirical, theoretical, 
and experimental perspective. In the first essay, I argue that the decoupling of inventory 
ownership from control in SBT creates an opportunity for retailers’ moral hazard and 
increase the level of waste. I support my hypothesis using data collected from a major 
U.S. bakery supplier, four large grocers and their stores in the Northeastern U.S., and the 
U.S. Census Bureau. In the second essay, I search for a reason why any supplier would 
rationally want to adopt SBT contracts in the presence of excess inventory shrink. 
Drawing from interviews I had with suppliers and retailers, I build a theoretical model 
describing a game between a supplier and a retailer. Results highlights an integrative 
potential of SBT contracts reflected in the reduction of inventory overage and underage 
under high demand uncertainty The third essay approaches this phenomenon from a 
power perspective. When SBT contracts are adopted as a result of retailer power, how 
can a weak supplier minimize is loss? I investigate behaviorally the impact of retailer 
power on the performance of SBT contracts, as well as the mitigating role of service 
concessions, through a bargaining experiment. The three essays in my dissertation 
disclose some of the causes of SBT failure as a collaborative inventory management 
initiative and identify SBT’s integrative potential using both positivistic and normative 
research methodologies.
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CHAPTER 1 
THE IMPACT OF SUPPLY CHAIN CONTRACTS ON INVENTORY SHRINKAGE: 
INFERENCE FROM PACKAGED FOOD PRODUCTS 
 
ABSTRACT 
Scan-Based Trading (SBT) contracts have emerged as a popular alternative to vendor-
managed inventory (VMI) contracts as a way to improve the flow of materials and 
information between firms in food supply chains. In contrast to VMI, suppliers under 
SBT contracts remain the owners of the inventory delivered to retailers until it is sold to 
consumers. While SBT contracts involve clear benefits to both buyers and suppliers, they 
also involve unique inventory ownership and risk considerations which result from 
retailers managing supplier-owned inventory without bearing the cost of mismanagement. 
This paper examines the effect of SBT on inventory shrinkage using a data set from a 
packaged bakery manufacturer in the U.S. We find that the amount of inventory 
shrinkage tends to be higher under SBT contracts compared to VMI contracts when 
measured in terms of both explicit and non-explicit shrink. We attribute this effect to 
retailers’ moral hazard under SBT contracts. Our findings are important to suppliers who 
are considering adopting SBT contracts as the hidden cost of inventory shrinkage may 
outweigh the promised benefits of SBT contracts. Our findings highlight a potential loss 
in efficiency in food supply chains reflected in higher inventory shrinkage under SBT 
contracts. Our study calls for a careful reexamination of emerging contractual forms in 
light of their potential impact on inventory waste.    
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INTRODUCTION 
Advances in retail scanning technology in the consumer packaged goods industry 
have led to the emergence of Scan-Based Trading (SBT) contracts as an alternative to 
Vendor-Managed Inventory (VMI) agreements. Under VMI contracts, retailers delegate 
replenishment decisions and activities to suppliers, while in SBT contracts suppliers are 
not only responsible for planning inventory replenishments at retail stores, but they also 
maintain ownership of this inventory until products are scanned and sold to consumers 
(Kinsey, 1999). While SBT contracts promise better information flow to suppliers, but 
create a potential moral hazard problem as inventory ownership is separated from its 
control. In this paper, we examine how SBT contracts realign inventory-management 
incentives, and draw some implications for inventory waste from an empirical model of 
moral hazard and contract form.    
SBT eliminates the need for inventory check-ins at the stores and, thus, gives 
suppliers greater autonomy and flexibility in scheduling inventory replenishment relative 
to VMI agreements. Moreover, invoices created by suppliers that enter SBT agreements 
are directly linked to the retailers’ point-of-sale (POS) terminals. As a result, suppliers 
can gain access to real-time sales data specific to each stock keeping unit (SKU) at each 
retail store, thereby improving their sales forecasts and replenishment planning.  
Retailers benefit from SBT contracts because they can lower the financial risk 
associated with carrying inventory by transferring ownership to suppliers. Moreover, 
because inventory ownership under SBT does not shift at the point of store-delivery, 
retailers can eliminate activities targeted to processing and checking inventory, 
decreasing backroom operations. These benefits have led to the widespread adoption of 
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SBT by retailers such as Walmart, Target, CVS, Sears, and Home Depot and suppliers, 
such as Nestle, Hallmark, and Pepperidge Farm – and the trend is growing (Wolf, 2015). 
 Despite the clear benefits to retailers and suppliers, SBT carries with it unique 
inventory ownership and risk considerations that are generally not found in VMI 
contracts. Namely, because suppliers retain ownership until inventory is scanned out of 
the store by consumers, yet retailers remain responsible for managing shelf-space and 
promoting sales, there is a clear moral hazard problem created by the misalignment of the 
incentives facing each party. As a result, SBT contracts have the potential to increase 
inventory shrinkage1 at retail stores relative to that found under VMI contracts. Greater 
inventory shrinkage, in turn, can represent a considerable shortcoming in a SBT contract 
relative to VMI as it will likely go unnoticed until after the SBT contract is implemented. 
In this paper, we develop a set of hypotheses regarding the expected impact of SBT 
contracts on inventory shrinkage in relation to VMI contracts and test our hypotheses 
using a unique data set from the retail packaged foods industry. 
By focusing on inventory shrink, we call attention to a fundamental outcome 
under various forms of retailer-supplier contracts, particularly SBT, which has been 
largely overlooked in the literature. Previous research on SBT contracts generally assume 
that all inventory replenished by suppliers will be available for sale (Ben-Daya et al., 
2013; Gümüş, Jewkes, and Bookbinder, 2008; Ru and Wang, 2010). However, this may 
not necessarily be the case as inventory shrink under SBT contracts may be greater than 
                                                           
1 Inventory shrinkage at retail stores corresponds to the loss of inventory between the times of 
supply and sales at the stores. 
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under VMI contracts, which may substantially offset the economic benefits of adopting 
SBT.  
We also contribute to the empirical literature on inventory management 
relationships as we study the performance implications of SBT adoption from the 
perspective of both retailers and suppliers who are already engaged in VMI contracts. 
Research on SBT contracts focuses primarily on the benefits of SBT relative to 
traditional consignment contracts and not with respect to VMI contracts. In consignment 
contracts, retailers shift inventory ownership to suppliers while retaining the control of 
inventory replenishment decisions (Gümüş et al., 2008; Hu, Li, and Govindan, 2014; Ru 
and Wang, 2010), while in SBT contracts suppliers maintain both the ownership of 
inventories and the control of their replenishment at retail stores. Not surprisingly, past 
research reports notable benefits associated with SBT, relative to consignment, due to the 
suppliers’ ability to control inventory replenishments at the stores, which is absent in 
consignment contracts.  
Evaluating whether levels of inventory shrink at retail stores in SBT contracts 
exceed those observed in VMI contracts is an important question, particularly in the 
grocery retailing sector where SBT contracts have become a common alternative to VMI 
contracts. In grocery retailing, net margins are typically less than 2% (Watson, Wood, 
Fernie, 2015), so any unexpected loss of inventory can mean the difference between 
profit and loss. Further, grocery retailing is a natural setting for the growth of SBT as 
most supermarkets manage upwards of 30,000 unique stock-keeping units (SKUs), from 
thousands of different vendors.  
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Whether retailers benefit from SBT depends on the incentive structure put in 
place by handing inventory control over to vendors. SBT changes the nature of inter-
organizational boundaries and the incentives facing retailers and suppliers in a 
fundamental way. Under VMI, inventory ownership is transferred from suppliers to 
retailers upon delivery and, therefore, the residual risk associated with inventory 
management falls on the retailer’s shoulders (Lee and Whang, 2008). In SBT contracts, 
however, the supplier remains the owner of the inventory stocked at the retailer’s stores 
and is exposed to the risk of inventory shrinkage (Rungtusanatham et al., 2007). The fact 
that the supplier is financially responsible for any deficiencies in managing retail sales by 
the retailer is a key distinguishing characteristic of SBT. Indeed, a clear agency problem 
arises under SBT as retailers are under no obligation to ensure that all of the supplier’s 
inventory is handled properly, and sold effectively, at the retail end. We argue that SBT 
creates a moral hazard problem wherein SBT is likely to amplify inventory shrinkage, 
and reduce supplier profit.  
Isolating the independent effect of contract form on shrink is not straightforward 
as supply relationships are inherently complex, and many variables determine how much 
product is lost between the supplier, and cash register. Consequently, we design a natural 
data experiment that allows us to estimate the causal effect of SBT contracts on shrink, 
and control for any other mediating factors econometrically. Specifically, along with the 
type of supply contract, we also consider operational factors between the supplier-retailer 
dyad namely, the allocation of control responsibilities in the execution of inventory 
deliveries between the supplier and the retail stores and the allocation of shelf space at 
the stores. We expect that the outsourcing by the supplier of in-store inventory deliveries 
  6 
to third parties will contribute additional amounts of shrink between the dyad and that the 
amount of shelf space allocated to an SKU and the amount of in-store traffic will increase 
the amount of shrink for that item. 
We test these hypotheses using a unique archival dataset that describes a natural 
experiment in SBT relative to VMI by a major U.S. bakery supplier (referred to as Zeta2 
hereafter). This dataset consists of daily supply and sales quantities of Zeta’s SKUs at 
multiple grocery stores owned by different retail chains in the Northeastern U.S.  
Our data offers several advantages relative to more traditional, retail scanner data 
alone.  First, focusing on a single supplier within a market region allows us to maintain a 
tight control of the impact of factors such as supply lead-times and weather conditions on 
inventory replenishment activities which could influence the levels of observed shrink. 
Second, focusing on one supplier allows us to effectively control for other, potentially 
confounding, factors that may influence the level of observed shrink. Third, our data 
includes daily POS data from our supplier for its products from stores owned by retailers 
with which the supplier had VMI and other retailers that purchase under SBT contracts. 
With data on both SBT and non-SBT stores, our data describe a natural experiment in 
that we are able to compare shrink with and without different contract forms. In this way, 
we are able to cleanly identify variation in shrink that is due specifically to the SBT 
contract form.   
Our data are both rare, and represent a unique opportunity to examine the effects 
of SBT, because, under VMI contracts, retailers are not obligated to share daily POS 
information with suppliers. Having access to daily POS data under both VMI and SBT 
                                                           
2
 We disguise the supplier’s name per its request.  
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contracts enables us to incorporate a high level of detail in the empirical assessment of 
inventory shrinkage and test for the causal effect of supply chain contracts on shrink. 
Moreover, because Zeta is a dominant firm in the bakery-goods industry in the U.S., we 
minimize the possibility that its SBT and VMI contracts are subject to the type of 
bargaining-power asymmetries other smaller suppliers commonly face.  
We find that the amount of inventory shrinkage is significantly higher under SBT 
contracts compared to that found under VMI contracts, ceteris paribus. This result is 
consistent with our prediction that the decoupling of inventory ownership and control, 
and the misalignment of the incentives to manage inventory properly that ensues, will 
cause inventory loss to rise, unless retailers are properly monitored or incentivized. If 
adopting SBT contracts releases retailers from the responsibility of inventory shrinkage, 
they are more likely to manage inventory without the same care and attention they would 
if the inventory was under their ownership. We also find that the use of third party 
providers to carry out the delivery of inventory at the stores on behalf of the supplier and 
the amount of shelf space allocated to inventory at the stores contribute to increasing 
shrinkage. Our findings highlight a potential downside to SBT contracts from a supplier’s 
perspective.  
The implications of our study go beyond food retailing and call for a careful 
reexamination of emerging contractual forms in terms of inventory waste more generally. 
Moreover, if the emergence of SBT contracts results from some form of asymmetric 
bargaining power in the food supply chain, then our findings may provide additional 
information of interest to anti-trust regulators concerned with the effects of increased 
concentration in either the supply industry, or among downstream retailers.  
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  The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a review 
of the related literature. Section 3 develops a framework to explain SBT from an Agency 
Theory perspective and the hypothetical presence of excess shrinkage under SBT 
contracts in relation to VMI contracts as well as under various operational practices 
found in the food sector. Section 4 describes our empirical model of shrink, and the 
methods we used to analyze our data. Section 5 presents the results from our empirical 
analysis. We discuss the implications and contributions of the results in Section 6. And 
Section 7 concludes the paper with the summary and the discussion of opportunities for 
future research. 
BACKGROUND 
There is a considerable amount of research surrounding the optimality of 
contractual arrangements between suppliers and retailers that falls within the scope of 
SBT. Boyaci and Gallego (2002) show that maximum channel profits can be realized 
under arrangements in which suppliers can attain optimal lot sizes by offering quantity 
discounts. In a related study, Gümüş et al. (2008) show that this type of contract can be 
beneficial to both suppliers and retailers when suppliers have flexible capacity and 
retailers have relatively larger order costs.  
These studies, however, do not consider potential discrepancies between supply 
and sales as reflected in inventory shrinkage. Persona, Grassi, and Catena (2005) consider 
such a possibility in a supply chain context. Focusing on inventory obsolescence (e.g., 
due to technology and market changes), the authors conclude that optimal inventory 
levels are lower in the presence of inventory obsolescence because of the increased risk 
to the supplier. We extend this research by studying agency effects on inventory 
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shrinkage resulting from the decoupling of inventory ownership and control stipulated by 
SBT contracts in relation to VMI contracts. 
 In examining the impact of SBT contracts on inventory shrink at retail stores in 
relation to VMI contracts, our study also extends prior research on retail inventory 
shrinkage. While past research recognizes the importance of shrinkage as a determinant 
of retailers’ performance (Bailey, 2006), academic research on the topic largely focuses 
on theft as the only form of shrinkage (e.g., Greenberg, 2002; Avery, Mckay, and Hunter, 
2012) at the expense of other forms of shrinkage. Focusing narrowly on theft as a form of 
shrinkage, past studies highlight the effect of socioeconomic and demographic factors on 
shrink outcomes. There are, however, other factors that may influence shrink. For 
example, inventory could be damaged or spoiled due to careless stock management and 
misplaced in the course of temporal promotions. Particularly in the grocery business, 
spoilage could be a key contributor to shrink.  Our paper takes these into consideration.  
 Specifically, our paper takes into account the design of retailer-supplier contracts 
and retail store operations as well. In particular, our research considers the impact on 
shrink caused by contracts designed to decouple inventory ownership and control 
responsibilities between retailers and suppliers. In addition, we consider shrink effects 
associated with in-store inventory delivery assignments to third party providers andshelf-
space allocation. In so doing, we provide a more holistic understanding of the causes of 
retail inventory shrinkage. 
 By focusing on inventory shrink in the context of the retail packaged foods 
industry, we also contribute valuable insights regarding various sources of food waste. A 
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range of stakeholders in the food supply chain is increasingly concerned with waste. 
While managers tend to worry about waste’s effects on economic efficiency, policy 
makers look at waste from a broader sustainability perspective. Moreover, sustainability 
has emerged as an important issue for consumers, as they have become more aware of the 
environmental implications of their purchasing behaviors. As a consequence, retailers 
have tried to account for these consumer concerns by taking into account greenhouse gas 
emissions (Cachon, 2014; Belavina, Girotra, and Kabra, 2016) and inventory waste when 
designing their supply chains (Akkas, Gaur, and Simchi-Levi, 2014). As more retailers 
continue to implement sustainability initiatives to improve their energy use, emissions, 
and waste, research on sustainable retail operations will continue to grow (Kotzab et al., 
2011; Wiese, 2013). Our study of inventory shrink under SBT and VMI contracts in the 
food retailing sector contributes additional insights to this research stream regarding the 
role that retailer-supplier contracts play in generating food waste and offers implications 
regarding the use of these contracts as part of sustainable retail operations.  
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
We ground our research on Agency Theory to explain how retailer-supplier 
contracts involving VMI and SBT influence inventory shrink. Agency Theory concerns a 
broad suite of issues that arise from the separation of ownership and control when an 
owner (the principal) delegates work to an agent (Fama and Jensen, 1983). In general, 
agency creates a potential conflict of interest because the objectives of the principal may 
differ from those of the agent. Because the principal cannot observe the actions of the 
agent directly, there is asymmetric information in that the agent always has more 
information about his/her own behavior. When the agent pursues his own interest at the 
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expense of those of the principal under the information asymmetry, what is known as a 
moral hazard problem arises (Arrow, 1968). Since the agent is hired by the principal to 
do the work and the consequences—the costs and benefits, the residual risk—of the 
agent’s work are largely borne by the principal, the principal assumes the costs of the 
agent’s moral hazard in the absence of any protection mechanisms. 
Retailer-Supplier Contracts and the Agency Problem 
Although the generalizability of Agency Theory in understanding various 
contractual relationships such as employer-employee, buyer-supplier, and lawyer-client 
relationships is well documented in the literature (Eisenhardt, 1989; Harris and Raviv, 
1978), the applicability of Agency Theory to inter-organizational contractual 
relationships in the context of retail supply chains, in general, and SBT, in particular, has 
not been carefully scrutinized. The lack of consensus as to who the principal and the 
agent are in a retailer-supplier relationship in SBT is a reflection of deficiencies in the 
application of the theory to various phenomena (Hypko, Tilebein, and Gleich, 2010; 
Rungtusanatham et al., 2007). The problem seems to originate from two different sources 
of confusion: first, in the definition of agency and, second, in the concept of delegation.   
 The definition of agency in a general sense is not exactly the same as that specific 
to Agency Theory.  In philosophy, agency denotes one’s ability to make choices on 
behalf of oneself. In a principal-agent relationship, the agent has agency—the ability to 
make choices for himself—and the principal has agency as well. However, Agency 
Theory’s reference to agency is grounded in a situation where the agent’s ability to make 
choices for himself influences the well-being of the principal, who is exposed to the 
consequences of the agent’s choices. While potentially every individual and organization 
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has agency, Agency Theory is particularly relevant in situations where agency creates 
problems in the context of the separation of ownership and control. The misapplication of 
Agency Theory to situations where there is no clear separation of ownership and control 
creates confusion about the nature of agency problems and the proper solutions to them.  
 In turn, delegation denotes an act of giving control and authority to another 
individual or party. In the classic Agency Theory context, the principal, i.e. the employer, 
delegates work to the agent who is hired by the principal for wages. In this context, the 
direction of delegation is clear: the principal delegates work to the agent for wages. 
However, in an SBT context, the concept of delegation is somewhat blurred. In their 
study of SBT, Rungtusanatham et al. (2007) treated the retailer as the principal and the 
supplier as the agent. They argued that, in SBT, “the retailer delegates and contracts the 
work and responsibility for maintaining and replenishing inventory at the retail location 
to the vendor. In such an agency relationship, the performance outcome of consequence 
is not actual sales per se, but the availability for sale of retail items measured, perhaps, in 
terms of such metrics as quantities on hand or units available for sale.” (Rungtusanatham 
et al. 2007, p.120). However, from a different perspective, we argue that, in SBT, the 
vendor can act as the principal who delegates sales service activities to the retailer. The 
source of this divergence in views is that, in SBT, retailer-vendor relationships are 
inherently different from employer-employee relationships.  
In an employer-employee relationship, the employee is hired by the employer and 
is delegated to make choices on behalf of the employer in exchange for wages. These 
choices lie within a single point in the value creating process and their delegation is 
unidirectional (from the employer to the employee). However, in retailer-vendor 
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relationships under SBT, the retailer and the vendor are in charge of different parts of the 
value creation process that ultimately tries to satisfy end consumers’ demand. Their work 
is divided in an attempt to maximize the efficiency of the supply chain. In a sense, they 
are making choices on each other’s behalf in order to profit from end customers’ demand 
(Vargo, Maglio, and Akara, 2008). Such a process of mutual exchange can take place 
under various inter-organizational governance structures. Therefore, the simple fact that a 
retailer pays (passes along profits to) a vendor does not entitle the retailer to be the 
principal.  
The Principal-Agent Relationship under SBT 
The principal-agent relationship between a retailer and a vendor under an SBT 
contract differs substantially from the relationship in a VMI contract. When a vendor and 
retailer engage in a VMI contract, once inventory is delivered to the stores, the ownership 
and control of the inventory are transferred from the vendor to the retailer. Inventory 
ownership and control are never decoupled under this type of contract. In contrast, SBT 
involves a distinct decoupling of inventory ownership and control at the time suppliers 
deliver inventory to the stores. Even after inventories are delivered to the retailers’ 
premises, the suppliers continue to own the inventories throughout the sales process and, 
and consequently, the retailers become agents that control, arrange, and rotate the 
inventories owned by the suppliers.  
We focus on the principal-agent relationship that arises from the moment the 
supplier’s products are delivered to the retailer’s premises until final sales are made to 
consumers (i.e., post-delivery). In this case, the supplier is a principal because it owns the 
inventory and the retailer is an agent because it holds the supplier’s inventory on the 
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supplier’s behalf. Moreover, the way in which the retailer supervises the supplier’s 
products during this period has an important role in influencing the supplier’s 
profitability. Specifically, the retailer’s decisions on how to market the supplier’s 
products to stimulate interest, assure quality, and protect them from misplacement, theft, 
or damage will determine sales and shrink. In turn, the supplier’s profitability depends on 
how the retailer chooses to display, rotate, and organize the inventory at its stores 
(Chevalier, 1975; Chandon et al., 2009; Nordfält and Lange, 2013).  
 Principal-agent relationships often give rise to moral hazard, or “hidden action” 
problems (Arrow, 1968). A moral hazard arises in SBT relationships when suppliers 
cannot monitor perfectly how retailers merchandize their products at the store level. And 
even though retailers and SBT suppliers normally have a common goal of generating 
sales from end customers, conflicts may arise when retailers deal simultaneously with 
numerous suppliers in each product category that contribute to their own profitability. 
Retailers seek to maximize category profit, while suppliers are only concerned with profit 
from their own sales. In this case, the risk of poor inventory management is born by the 
SBT supplier because items from other non-SBT suppliers insulate the retailer from the 
risk of lost sales. Moreover, because payment in SBT contracts is based on actual sales, 
the retailer does not pay for lost inventory.  
Under these conditions, retailers may direct their efforts to those activities and 
suppliers that contribute the most to retail profitability, and not necessarily to maximizing 
profit for each individual supply relationship. As a result, suppliers under SBT contracts 
may end up being exposed to higher levels of shrink at retail stores than those observed 
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under other contracts, particularly VMI, where retailers own and control the inventories 
of products available at their stores. Therefore, our primary hypothesis is as follows:  
 
Hypothesis 1. Shrink levels at retail stores are higher in retailer-supplier relationships 
governed by SBT contracts than in retailer-supplier relationships governed by VMI 
contracts  
 
 Besides the contractual choice and the resulting agency problem, there are a 
number of operational elements in retail supply chains that may impact inventory shrink. 
Two of such factors are the outsourcing by the supplier of in-store inventory deliveries 
and the allocation of shelf space at the stores. 
Outsourcing of In-Store Inventory Deliveries 
Companies outsource delivery and other logistics operations to reduce 
infrastructural investments and operating costs as well as to improve operational 
flexibility (Ashenbaum, Maltz, and Rabinovich, 2005; Maloni and Carter, 2006). 
Logistics outsourcing, or the use of 3rd party logistics (3PL), has grown so rapidly in the 
past several decades that nearly 80% of the Fortune 500 companies were relying on it in 
2005 (Lieb and Bentz, 2005). The food industry is not an exception to this trend. 
According to a survey of food and beverage logistics managers conducted by Saddle 
Creek Corporation in 2007, the U.S. food industry relies on 3rd party motor carries with 
80% of its shipments.  
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Food companies increasingly rely on 3PL operators because the use of 3PL has 
helped food companies avoid the use of food distributors who often add significant 
margins on route to the retailer, increasing the consumer prices and lowering 
competitiveness (Anderson, 2015). Moreover, with the increasing need for small and 
frequent deliveries for perishable items, food companies often suffer from low utilization 
of their logistics assets. Given the extremely high logistics costs in these supply chains, 
the use of 3PL operators can be cost competitive since they enjoy higher levels of asset 
utilization by consolidating shipments across different clients (Bourlakis and Weightman, 
2004). In a similar vein, without having to invest in capital intensive logistics assets, food 
companies can maintain flexibility in rapidly changing environment by turning 
investments in in-house logistics into variable costs through the use of 3PL (McKinnon, 
2004).  
While it may be true that logistics outsourcing helps suppliers reduce investments, 
improve utilization, and cut down operating costs, these advantages may come at the 
expense of a decrease in the quality of execution of inventory replenishments. It may be 
the case that in-store shrink rises due to suppliers’ inability to prevent employees working 
for 3PL providers from behaving negligently when they deliver inventory to the retailers. 
3PL employees may shirk their work responsibilities by handling products in a way that 
does not preserve their quality (Rayner, 1998), which results in more shrink due to 
damage, spoilage, misplacement, and theft. We expect that shrink levels at retail stores 
will be higher in retailer-supplier relationships when 3PL providers are in charge of 
carrying out inventory replenishments than when suppliers are directly in charge of 
carrying out these replenishments.  
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Hypothesis 2: Shrink levels at retail stores are higher when store deliveries are 
outsourced to 3PL providers compared to the case where the supplier is directly 
responsible for the deliveries’ execution.  
 
   Shelf Space Allocation  
Shelf space is precious real estate in the retail industry. Given that an average 
retailer carries more than 42,214 SKUs in a 46,000-square-feet store (Food Marketing 
Institute, 2014), negotiating shelf space for individual product is one of the most critical 
contractual decisions in the supplier-retailer dyad. Accordingly, suppliers negotiate for 
greater shelf space (Dréze, Hoch, and Purk, 1994), paying substantial slotting fees for 
new products, or pay-to-stay fees for existing products in order to secure the most visible 
shelf location (O’Dwyer, 2015; Wilkie, Desrochers, Gundlach, 2002). Shelf-space, 
however, is also likely to affect shrink.   
When a supplier is granted a large amount of shelf space, the exposure to product 
obsolescence is high. For perishable items, in particular, customers often check the “sell 
by” dates of available inventory to find the freshest item. The larger the number of items 
available, the harder it is for the retailer to sell the oldest items first (i.e., FIFO), so the 
number of expired items rises. In addition, as shelf space size rises, it becomes 
increasingly more difficult to rotate inventory to minimize obsolescence. Moreover, the 
larger the shelf space allocated to a product, the larger the amount of inventory exposed 
to theft and damage by customers at any given time (Corsten and Gruen, 2003). As a 
result, as the amount of shelf space allocated to a product increases, inventory shrink for 
that product is likely to go up as well.  
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Hypothesis 3. Shrink levels at retail stores are positively associated with the shelf spaces 
assigned to the inventory  
 
EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY 
Having developed our study’s theoretical framework, we turn our attention to 
explaining how we test this framework using an econometric model of shrink in a natural 
experiment generated by a retailer that uses both SBT and VMI replenishment methods.  
Our data consist of supply, inventory, and retail sales values for products in Zeta’s 
bakery brand portfolio. Our focus on Zeta’s bakery products is particularly relevant to our 
research for a number of reasons. First, these products have a short shelf life and, 
therefore, a high potential for shrinkage. Second, retail sales of bakery products are 
economically significant, generating approximately $30 billion in revenue annually in the 
U.S. Third, the perishable nature of bakery goods, coupled with an on-going, continuous 
demand, generates frequent and short replenishment cycles, which provides us with the 
opportunity to collect deep time-series, cross-sectional, panel data. Fourth, products 
manufactured by Zeta include many of the top national brands valued by customers. 
Accordingly, regardless of the type of contract used with Zeta (VMI or SBT), retailers 
have a clear motivation to ensure these products’ availability at their stores in order to 
prevent any loss in customer goodwill.   
Contracts governing the relationship between Zeta and each of the grocers it 
works with are based exclusively on either SBT or VMI. There are no consignment 
contracts in place that could distort the direct comparison of shrink between SBT and 
VMI contracts. SBT contracts are extensions of VMI contracts such that, under SBT and 
  19 
VMI contracts, Zeta is responsible for the delivery and replenishment of inventories. 
Under both types of contract, no inventory is placed at retail stores’ backrooms. 
However, under SBT, Zeta financially owns the inventories at the stores until they are 
purchased by consumers. Therefore, our data experiment is “clean” in the sense that our 
data capture only the essential differences between outcomes under VMI and SBT 
contracts. In this section, we first summarize the Zeta data, and provide some stylized 
facts regarding our primary hypothesis regarding the difference in shrink among contract 
forms, and then provide more detail on our econometric methodology.  
Data Description 
The dataset consists of daily supply and sales quantities for Zeta’s stock-keeping 
units (SKUs) sold at stores owned by four major supermarket chains in the New England 
and Mid-Atlantic regions of the U.S. These four chains are comparable in size and cover 
the majority of markets in these regions (See Figure 1). Moreover, while the relationships 
between Zeta and two of these retail chains (Alpha and Gamma) are governed by VMI 
contracts, its relationships with the two other chains (Beta and Delta) are governed by 
SBT contracts. This data structure offers a natural experiment setting in which 
comparable products sold at comparable retail outlets are subject to two different forms 
of contractual arrangement. In our dataset, we track 36 stores and 96 SKUs across all four 
chains for 168 days, from January 2015 to June 2015. Although stores carried different 
subsets of SKUs, the data we gathered across the four chains had a balanced number of 
80 store-SKU combinations per chain (Figure 2). Moreover, for each chain, half of the 
store-SKU combinations involved deliveries by 3PL providers while the other half 
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involved deliveries made directly by Zeta. Taken together, we collected a total of 53,760 
observations across all stores and SKUs for the sample period.   
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Figure 2. Structure of Data 
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Our data also contains daily supplier credit quantities. These credit quantities 
reflect the number of damaged or expired units for each SKU at all stores on a daily 
basis. These quantities provide a measure of daily shrink that is explicit to both Zeta and 
the retailers. Henceforth, we will refer to this measure as explicit shrink. We also 
captured shrink that is not explicit to both Zeta and the retailers. This form of shrink 
(henceforth referred to as non-explicit shrink) corresponds to the loss of inventory due to 
theft, misplacement, or otherwise unexplained loss at the stores. Computing the exact 
values of daily non-explicit shrink requires the full knowledge of daily on-hand inventory 
levels for the 168-day period for each SKU-store combination. Since Zeta does not count 
inventory on a daily basis, we estimated daily non-explicit shrink using available data on 
daily deliveries, sales, and explicit shrink.  
We estimate non-explicit shrink using a two-step process. First, for each SKU-
store combination, we calculated a daily net oversupply, corresponding to the number of 
new items delivered, minus sales, and minus the explicit shrink quantities observed per 
day. In essence, the daily net oversupply values reflect the maximum amount of 
inventory from each day’s new delivery that is exposed to causes of non-explicit shrink 
(theft, misplacement, etc.) after daily sales have been realized and explicit shrink 
volumes have been deducted. Thus, daily net oversupply values serve as a conservative, 
but consistent, basis to measure non-explicit shrink from daily new store replenishments3.  
                                                           
3
 Note that these values can be negative when there are positive amounts of inventory on-hand 
prior to each day’s new replenishments. When that happens, we know for a fact that the amount 
of non-explicit shrink from that day’s new shipment is zero. Therefore, we were only concerned 
about the case when the daily net oversupply was positive. 
  22 
In the second step, we adjust daily net oversupply values downward in order to 
account for the possibility that these surplus amounts could have been used potentially to 
meet future demand during the rest of the product’s shelf life. Given that Zeta’s products 
have a seven-day shelf life, we considered the next six days when adjusting each day’s 
net oversupply.  
Consider the following examples of daily oversupply for a product’s 7-day period 
shelf life: (12, -3, -4, -2, 0, -1, -2). On Day 1, there was a daily net over supply of 12 
units. In theory, there should be 12 units remaining on the shelf for the next day’s sale. 
On Day 2, the net oversupply is -3. Since we have 12 units of oversupply from Day 1 
(which are good for sale until the end of Day 7), we can satisfy the 3 units of extra 
demand on Day 2 from Day 1’s inventory. Extending this logic until the end of Day 7, we 
know that none of the 12 units of daily oversupply on Day 1 was lost because the daily 
sales that were larger than the daily new replenishments and explicit shrink amounts on 
Day 2 through Day 7 should have been made from this inventory. Had there been a 
positive amount of daily oversupply left from Day 1 after adjusting for the following six 
days’ oversupplies, we would have been able to identify a positive amount of non-explicit 
shrink from Day 14.  
Using this estimated non-explicit shrink series, we then calculated simple 
summary statistics to determine whether greater shrink under SBT contracts was a feature 
of our data, even before accounting for other factors that may explain shrink. A simple t-
test of the difference in average shrink between items under SBT and VMI revealed that, 
                                                           
4 Note that we are assuming that sales are made according to the last-in-first-out (LIFO) 
approach. This is a fair behavioral assumption for most perishable grocery items such as milk, 
yogurt, bread, and eggs (Bramorski, 2008). 
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on average, shrink is indeed significantly higher for items sold under SBT contracts 
compared to those under VMI contacts. Comparing shrink under SBT and VMI yields a 
difference of 1.05 unit of explicit shrink and 1.14 unit of non-explicit shrink (p<0.001, t= 
-9.90 for non-explicit shrink and p<0,001, t= -17.80 for explicit shrink). However, this 
summary evidence does not control for other factors that may explain shrink, such as 
logistics operations, shelf space, product characteristics, or differences in customers 
across stores.  
The variable, Outsourcing, accounts for whether inventory replenishments at 
retail stores are carried out directly by Zeta or by a 3PL provider. Outsourcing takes a 
value of 1 when inventory replenishments are carried out by a 3PL provider and 0 
otherwise. Our data set includes indicators of whether each SKU distributed to each of 
the store location was delivered by Zeta or a 3PL provider. We expect that explicit and 
non-explicit shrink levels at retail stores will be higher in retailer-supplier relationships 
when 3PL providers are in charge of carrying out inventory replenishments than when 
suppliers are directly in charge of carrying out these replenishments. 
The variable, Shelf Space, measures the amount of shelf space allocated to 
products at retail stores. We used the average of the replenishment quantities delivered 
for each SKU at each store over the sample period to measure the shelf space assigned to 
each SKU at each store. This approach is superior to measuring shelf space directly from 
store planograms because it incorporates instances in which large replenishments were 
made in order to accommodate for temporary promotional displays. 
Two control variables in our model correspond to retail store demographics, as 
reflected in each store’s customer traffic (Customer Traffic) and average purchasing 
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power among nearby households (Household Purchasing Power). First, we expect that 
shrink will be higher at retail stores with higher customer traffic relative to stores with 
limited traffic because inventory at the former is exposed to more customers at any given 
time (Clarke, 2002), and so it is subject to a higher probability of damage, theft, or loss.  
Second, we expect that shrink will be lower at stores located in areas in which 
households have, on average, high purchasing power relative to stores in areas where 
households have low purchasing power (Miller and Gaines, 1997). Stores in relatively 
low income neighborhoods are more likely to be subject to shrink due to theft and 
vandalism, which can seriously undermine profits and even result in store closures 
(Clarke and Petrossian, 2013). We measure these variables using data from the U.S. 
Census Bureau and from Nielsen demographic statistics for each store’s zip code area. 
We used zip code population density (total population divided by total square miles of the 
zip code area) as a measure of customer traffic for each store and zip code and household 
spending (retail spending divided by the number of households in the zip code area) as a 
measure of consumer purchasing power for each store.  
The nature of products may also influence shrink. Research has shown that shrink 
is higher for items that are of relatively high unit value or price and are highly desired by 
different segments of the population (Bamfield, 2004). By focusing on a single product 
category, bakery, we limit the range of product desirability in our study. We control for 
product price to capture the variance in shrinkage due to the value of the products. We 
also segment SKUs in our data across four subcategories in order to control for potential 
differences in shrink among products in these subcategories.  
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Consistent with common practice in the bakery industry, we group the SKUs into 
the following four subcategories: (1) baked breads-loaves (33% of sampled SKUs), (2) 
buns, muffins, and bagels (33% of SKUs), (3) soft cakes and donuts (32% of SKUs), and 
(4) others (e.g., pita wraps, pizza dough) (2% of SKUs). We use binary representations 
for each of these categories in our statistical analyses.  
Finally, we controlled for temporal effects. We constructed a binary variable 
(Weekend) that takes a value of 0 if the day on which we measured shrink is a weekday or 
1 otherwise (i.e., Saturday or Sunday) in order to account for the effect of different 
shopping patterns inherent in the timing of purchases. We will discuss the effect of this as 
well as other time specifications as part of our analyses in Section 5.3. 
Table 1 summarizes the data for the 36 grocery stores and 96 SKUs in our sample.  
Both shrink measures refer to daily amounts of product losses, the contract and 
outsourcing variables are binary and take the value of 1 for SBT contracts and 3PL, 
respectively. Our data show that the amounts of inventory shrinkage fluctuates highly on 
a daily basis. On average, products in our sample have roughly one unit of product loss 
due to damage or spoilage and two units of product loss due to unspecifiable reasons such 
as theft or misplacement. Given the average shelf space of 36.9 units, these amounts of 
product loss seem significant. 
Our summary statistic provides strong evidence that shrink at stores using SBT is 
higher than stores using VMI contracts. However, econometric confirmation of this 
evidence may be confounded by the observation that contract choice may be endogenous 
to the amount of shrink observed at each type of store. That is, SBT contracts may be 
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offered to stores that are inherently more conducive to shrink, so the identification of the 
precise, independent effect of contract form requires a more nuanced approach.  
Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics 




(Units) 1.02 6.83 0 517 
Non-Explicit Shrink  
(Units) 2.38 13.37 0 579 
Contract 
(Binary: 1= SBT, 0= VMI) 0.50 0.50 0 1 
Outsourcing 
(Binary: 1= 3PL, 0= Zeta) 0.50 0.50 0 1 
Shelf Space 
(10 Units) 3.69 3.43 0.27 18.44 
Customer Traffic 
(Population Density at Store Zip Code  
;1000 People/Miles2) 
3.58 8.85 0.10 45.78 
Household Purchasing Power 
(Household Spending in $10,000at Store Zip Code) 6.22 0.96 4.48 8.37 
Price (Dollar) 2.41 0.88 0.78 5.16 
Product Category 
   Category 1-Loaves (binary: 1 or 0) 
   Category 2-Buns, muffins, and bagels (binary: 1 or 0) 
   Category 3-Soft cakes and donuts (binary: 1 or 0) 






















(Binary: 1= Shrink on Saturday or Sunday, 0= 
Otherwise) 
0.29 0.45 0 1 
 
Identification 
Our aim is to estimate the size of daily shrink (both explicit and non-explicit) as a 
function of contract form, outsourcing choice, shelf space, store-specific factors 
(customer traffic and household purchasing power), time-specific factors, and product 
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characteristics. The simplest approach to estimating our model is to use a pooled ordinary 
least square (OLS) regression method. However, pooled OLS is inappropriate when the 
error terms are serially correlated. When the error terms are serially correlated, the 
standard errors are biased, and any inferences drawn will be incorrect.  We checked the 
presence of serial correlation in our model using the Wooldridge test for autocorrelation 
in panel data (Drukker, 2003). The test results do not reject the null hypothesis of no first 
order autocorrelation in our models of explicit and non-explicit shrink at the significance 
level of p=0.05. Based on these test results, we conclude that serial correlation is not a 
threat in our estimation.  
The next econometric issue we consider is the potential endogeneity of contract 
terms.  Estimation by OLS requires that each of the regressors be uncorrelated with the 
error term. If not, then at least one explanatory variable is endogenous, and the equation 
estimates will be biased and inconsistent. In our case, contract choice is likely to be non-
random as unobservable factors may determine both shrink, and the decision to offer a 
SBT contract to the retailer in question. If this is the case, the independent SBT treatment 
effect is not identified without further modification. Rather, it reflects the characteristics 
of retail chains, particularly their inherent inventory management capabilities, which may 
also influence shrink. For example, retailers with subpar inventory management 
capabilities may prefer contract forms that delegate most of the inventory management 
responsibilities to the suppliers. As a result, the contract choice variable in the model may 
be endogenous with respect to shrink.  
  Our remedy employs an instrumental-variables estimator (Angrist and Imbens, 
1995) to overcome this identification problem. An ideal instrument would explain the 
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supermarket’s choice of contract form (i.e., relevant) but not the levels of shrink at its 
stores directly (Stock and Watson, 2003). We considered several basic supermarket-level 
variables as instruments, including the year the chains were founded, their number of 
employees, and their revenues. Each of these variables fulfill the logical requirements for 
instrument validity, namely that they are correlated with the endogenous explanatory 
variable, but mean-independent of the error term However, due to the frequent mergers 
and acquisitions in the grocery industry, the year of founding did not seem to be 
meaningfully related to how the supermarket chains operate today. Moreover, two of the 
chains are privately owned and, therefore, no objective information about the number of 
employees and revenues was available.  
Exogenous pressure to reduce operating costs could serve as an alternative 
instrument. SBT significantly lowers supermarkets’ cost of goods sold because they do 
not need to purchase the inventory they use for sales. SBT also reduces supermarkets’ 
labor costs since there is no need for retail managers to check inventory at the point of 
delivery. Given that most traditional supermarket chains follow a low cost strategy with 
thin margins, expanding the chain’s market coverage seems to be one of the critical 
success factors for growth. This observation may also explain the frequent mergers and 
acquisitions among grocery retailers. Nevertheless, market expansion is costly, so chains 
that have yet to expand their market may be in the most need for cost reductions in the 
future. Hence, a smaller market coverage implies a greater need for cost reduction in the 
future, and a higher likelihood of choosing a low cost contract form such as SBT down 
the road. Therefore, we use market coverage for each of the supermarket chains as our 
instrumental variable.  
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We measure market coverage as the total number of neighborhood areas served 
by each of the supermarket chain stores. To that end, we counted the number of unique 
zip codes where each supermarket chain’s stores are located and estimated the model 
using the method described below. 
Model Estimation 
We model the SBT treatment effect by including a binary variable (Contract) that 
takes a value of 1 when SBT contracts are used, and 0 when a retailer uses VMI 
contracts. Due to the identification arguments presented above, we used an endogenous 
dummy variable approach that uses the modified two-stage least squares (2SLS) method 
proposed by Wooldridge (2002)5.  
The modified 2SLS procedure, in fact, follows three stages. In the first stage, we 
estimated a probit model in which we explain the choice of contract form as a function of 
the instrument variable and a set of exogenous explanatory variables that include Shelf 
Space, Outsourcing, Consumer Traffic, Household Purchasing Power, the Product 
Category dummies, and Weekend, and computed the fitted probabilities. In the second 
stage, we regressed Contract on the fitted probabilities and the exogenous explanatory 
variables from the first stage. In the third stage, we regressed Shrink on the fitted values 
for Contract from the second stage and all the other predictors and covariates, except 
                                                           
5
 There are three alternative approaches to endogenous dummy variable models. Linear 
probability models, although the simplest to implement, are not robust to the level of 
endogeneity. Two control function models based on the work of Heckman (1978), a two-step 
approach and a full-information maximum likelihood method (FIML), are generally accepted but 
FIML is less robust to the specification error (Alvarez and Glasgow, 1999). In section 5.3, we 
present the results using a two-step CF approach as a robustness check. 
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Contract6. Unlike the two-stage probit least squares, the approach we adopt does not 
require adjustments of standard errors (Wooldridge, 2002). 
The first stage probit model is formally written as:  
Pr	
 = 1|,  = Ф +  + , 
where Contract is a binary variable with a value of 1 if the contract is SBT and 0 
otherwise, Ф∙ is the cumulative distribution function for a standardized normal random 
variable, z is the instrument, and  is the vector of covariates. In this stage, the 
endogeneity is purged from Contract using the instrument variable. It is important to note 
that we evaluated the robustness of the estimates with respect to our chosen instrument 
variable in relation to other potential instrument variables. We will discuss this evaluation 
in section 5.3. 
 In the second stage, we regressed contract on the fitted probabilities from the first 
stage and all other exogenous predictors in the model as follows: 
	
 =  + Ф +  + ϵ, 
where Ф = Ф +  +  ! from the first-stage probit. Using the parameters 
estimated from this model, we then computed predicted values for contract form, written 
	
" . This step enables us to use a non-linear probability for the treatment 
assignment without enforcing a specific distributional assumption for the first-stage 
                                                           
6
 This procedure is different from a two-stage probit least squares (2SPLS) approach (Alvarez and 
Glasgow, 1999) in which the predicted values from the probit model replaces the endogenous 
dummy variable in the second-stage OLS regression. This approach is also known as “the 
forbidden regression” since there is no guarantee that the fitted values from the first-stage will be 
uncorrelated with the error term in the second-stage (Angrist and Pischke, 2008). 
(1) 
(2) 
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model. In this way, the specification of the first-stage probit is not required to be precise. 
As long as the endogenous variable is partially correlated with Ф, this approach is robust 
to the misspecification of the probit model (Wooldridge, 2002). The approach simply 
requires that the instruments be correlated with the endogenous variable. 
In the third stage, we regressed shrink on 	
"  and all other exogenous 
predictors:   
#$ = %$ + %$	
" + %$&'()(
*+ + %$,-ℎ/01 -3	
/ 
+%$4-ℎ/01 -3	
/ & + ́6$ + u$ 
where * assumes values of 1 and 2 for explicit and non-explicit shrink, respectively, and ́ 
is a vector of covariates besides Outsourcing and Shelf Space. Note that we include a 
quadratic term to capture the non-linear effect of Shelf Space on shrinkage outcomes. 
This three-step procedure allows us to interpret the coefficients from the final 
stage OLS in a straightforward way as the bias due to endogeneity is taken into 
consideration in the earlier stages. We expect the coefficients % and %&to be positive 
and significant as we hypothesize that SBT contracts will induce greater shrinkage 
relative to VMI contracts. Similarly, we expect %& and %&& to be positive. As for the 
impact of Shelf Space, we expect %, and %&, as well as %4 and %&4 to be positive, 
reflecting the increasing difficulty in managing inventory as the amount of shelf space 
increases. For the control variables, we expect the coefficients for Customer Traffic to be 
positive while the coefficients for Household Purchasing Power to be negative. 
However, we do not have specific a priori expectations about the coefficients for the 
different product category dummies and the Weekend variable. It is possible, for instance, 
(3) 
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that inventories across product categories are exposed to different levels of shrink due to 
variations in packaging quality. There may also be differences in shrink during weekdays 
versus weekends due to variations in customer traffic and retail employee availability 
during those days of the week.  
RESULTS 
Instrument Validity 
Before evaluating the relationship between Contract and Shrink, we must confirm 
the validity of the instrument we chose for our analysis. To be considered valid, the 
instrument must be relevant and exogenous (Stock and Watson, 2003). Relevant 
instruments are those that are highly correlated with endogenous predictors even after 
controlling for all other exogenous variables that explain variation in the dependent 
variable. This requirement can be tested empirically for our instrument in the first stage 
of the three-stage procedure (Wooldridge, 2002). The generally accepted requirement in 
the econometrics literature is that the value of the F-statistic for the instruments be higher 
than 10 for a set of instruments to be relevant (Staiger and Stock,1997). In the case of a 
single endogenous variable and a single instrument, the absolute value of the t-statistic 
for the instrumental variable in the first-stage regression should be higher than 3.2. 
However, options for assessing instrument strength are limited in the case of endogenous 
dummy variable models. One commonly used test is to evaluate the statistical 
significance of the purging variable in the first-stage probit (Adams, Almeida, and 
Ferreira, 2009). As shown in Table 2, the absolute value of the z-statistic for our 
instrument (Zipcode) is 80.74 with p-value <0.001, after controlling for all other 
exogenous variables. Thus, our instrument not only has a significant relationship with the 
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contract choice in the expected direction but also does not appear to suffer from a weak 
instrument problem.  
Table 2 
The Determinants of Contract: Probit Model 
Independent Variables Coeff. S.E. Z P-Value 95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
Intercept 1.152 0.062 18.72 0.000 (1.031,     1.277) 
Zipcode (Instrument) -0.033 0.000 -84.47 0.000 (-0.033,  -0.032) 
Outsourcing -0.112 0.017 -6.44 0.000 (-0.147,  -0.078) 
Shelf Space 0.302 0.008 64.18 0.000 (0.015,     0.016) 
Shelf Space2 -0.013 0.001 -25.09 0.000 (-0.014, - 0.012) 
Price -0.304 0.012 -25.56 0.000 (-0.327,   0.280) 
Category2 -0.157 0.018 -8.76 0.000 (-0.191,  -0.122) 
Category3 1.030 0.031 33.14 0.000 (0.968,    1.090) 
Category4 -0.976 0.045 -21.67 0.000 (-1.065,  -0.888) 
Customer Traffic 0.021 0.003 7.70 0.000 (0.016,    0.027) 
Household Purchasing 
Power 
0.576 0.010 62.22 0.000 (0.558,    0.595) 
  
 
   
  
Log likelihood   -20,965.8      
Chi squared [D.F.=9] 32,595.5      
P-value 0.000      
McFadden Pseudo  
R-squared  
0.437         
 
Exogeneity requires that the instrument be uncorrelated with the error term in the 
main regression equation. Logically, the endogeneity of an instrument cannot be 
empirically tested, so the appropriateness of an instrument is typically supported through 
logical arguments. As explained in Section 4.2, a supermarket chain’s market coverage 
can explain its choice of supply-chain contract form. We argue that supermarket chains 
with relatively small market coverage will exhibit a greater need for market expansion, 
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and SBT will help them reduce costs, and prepare to open new stores at lower costs. We 
do not believe that the current market coverage directly influences shrink except, of 
course, through the choice of SBT. Furthermore, there is no reason to believe that shrink 
influences market coverage. Therefore, the possibility of reverse causality is safely ruled 
out. 
The Impact of Supply Chain Contracts on Inventory Shrink 
With the instrument validity established, we can now evaluate the relationship 
between contract and shrinkage. As a further test of the validity of our results, we 
checked for evidence of Contract endogeneity using Wu-Hausman tests7. For both 
explicit and non-explicit shrink, the test rejects the null hypothesis that Contract is 
exogenous (p=0.043 and p<0.001 respectively). Therefore, we can proceed to interpret 
the estimation results from our instrumental variables estimator.  
Tables 3 and 4 report the main results from the endogenous dummy variable 
model. The results show that the type of supply chain contract does have a significant 
impact on the level of explicit and non-explicit shrink, in support of our main hypothesis. 
Specifically, SBT contracts result in additional 0.923 units of explicit shrink and 0.701 
units of non-explicit shrink on average, compared to VMI contracts. Considering that the 
average shelf space is 36.94 in our data, these amounts translate into roughly a 2.5 
percent increase in explicit shrink and a 1.9 percent in non-explicit shrink. While the 
literature predominantly focuses on product- and customer-related factors of shrink 
                                                           
7
 The logic behind the Wu-Hausman test is that one compares a less efficient but consistent 
estimator (under the alternative model) to a more efficient but potentially inconsistent estimator 
(under the null model). If the two models produce the (statistically) same results, one can then 
choose the more efficient estimator (the null).  
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(Bamfield, 2004), our findings suggest that supply chain contracts contributes 
economically and statistically significant amounts of loss both in terms of explicit and 
non-explicit shrinkage.  
Table 3 
Endogenous Dummy Variable Model Results: Explicit Shrink 




Intercept -1.175 0.231 -5.10 0.000 (-1.627,   -0.723) 
Contract 0.923 0.145 6.36 0.000 (0.639,     1.208) 
Outsourcing 0.180 0.070 2.56 0.010 (0.042,     0.318) 
Shelf Space 0.073 0.028 2.63 0.008 (0.019,     0.027) 
Shelf Space2 0.011 0.002 5.50 0.000 (0.007,     0.015) 
Price  0.131 0.048 2.73 0.006 (0.037,     0.226) 
Category 2 -0.023 0.086 -0.26 0.792 (-0.191,     0.146) 
Category 3 -0.470 0.111 -4.25 0.000 (-0.687,   -0.253) 
Category 4 0.079 0.191 0.41 0.681 (-0.296,    0.454) 
Customer Traffic 0.013 0.004 3.31 0.001 (0.005,     0.020) 
Household Purchasing Power 0.152 0.036 4.25 0.000 (0.082,     0.222) 
Weekend -0.190 0.065 -2.94 0.003 (-0.316,   -0.063) 
  
 
   
  
F-statistic [9, 53750]  940.2      
P-value 0.000      
Adjusted R-squared8 0.019         
 
Shelf space also has a consistent effect on both explicit and non-explicit shrink. 
As expected, this effect is positive and significant. Specifically, a 10-unit increase in shelf 
space results in additional 0.073 unit of explicit shrink and 0.558 unit of non-explicit 
shrink on average, which corresponds respectively to 0.2 percent and 1.5 percent 
                                                           
8
 R-squared values from instrumental variable estimation cannot be interpreted in the usual way 
as a basis for F-tests of joint restrictions. The goal of instrumental variable estimation is “to 
provide better estimates of the ceteris paribus effect of x on y when x and u are correlated; 
goodness-of-fit is not a factor.” (Wooldridge, 2002:517) 
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increases, when compared against the average amount of shelf space available for these 
products. Moreover, these relationships become significantly stronger as the size of shelf 
space increases, as we anticipated.  
Table 4 
Endogenous Dummy Variable Model Results: Non-Explicit Shrink 
Independent Variables Coeff. S.E. Z P-Value 95% Confidence 
Interval 
Intercept -0.545 0.449 -1.21 0.225 (-1.423,    0.334) 
Contract 0.701 0.282 2.48 0.013 (0.147,     1.255) 
Outsourcing 0.405 0.137 2.96 0.003 (0.136,     0.673) 
Shelf Space 0.558 0.054 10.34 0.000 (0.452,     0.664) 
Shelf Space2 0.009 0.004 2.30 0.022 (0.001,     0.016) 
Price  0.224 0.093 2.40 0.017 (0.041,     0.407) 
Category 2 0.369 0.167 2.21 0.027 (0.042,     0.697) 
Category 3 0.105 0.215 0.49 0.089 (-0.317,    0.527) 
Category 4 0.359 0.372 0.96 0.335 (-0.371,    1.088) 
Customer Traffic -0.004 0.007 -0.58 0.564 (-0.109,    0.010) 
Household Purchasing 
Power 
0.105 0.070 -1.51 0.131 (-0.241,    0.031) 
Weekend 0.179 0.126 1.42 0.155 (-0.067,   0.425) 
  
 
   
  
F-statistic [11, 53750]  154.1      
P-value 0.000      
Adjusted R-squared 0.030         
 
The use of 3PL providers has a positive and significant effect on both types of 
shrink as expected. However, the effect of logistics outsourcing on non-explicit shrinkage 
was much bigger than its effect on explicit shrink (coefficients of 0.405 and 0.180 
respectively). Considering the average shelf space available, these amounts are roughly 
equivalent to additional 1.1 percent and 0.5 percent loss of inventory when store delivery 
is outsourced to a 3PL provider compared to cases when the supplier is directly in charge 
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of delivery. In terms of product characteristics, a one-dollar increase in price is associated 
with 0.131 unit increase in explicit shrinkage and 0.224 unit increase in non-explicit 
shrinkage which can be interpreted respectively as a 0.4 percent and a 0.6 percent 
increase in relation to the average amount shelf space available for these products.  
Among other variables, customer traffic and household purchasing power, though 
not significantly associated with the amount of non-explicit shrink, do influence explicit 
shrinkage positively. Last, there is no significant difference in the non-explicit shrinkage 
amounts that occur on weekdays versus weekends whereas there are significantly lower 
amounts of explicit shrinkage during weekends versus weekdays.  
In terms of dollar values, the supplier in our sample loses, on average, a total of 
$27.397 per SKU per store per week due to shrinkage ($15.571 of explicit shrink and 
$11.826 of non-explicit shrinkage) when switching from VMI to SBT contracts. 
Considering the actual number of SKUs each store carries and the total number of stores 
under SBT contracts, not to mention the potential loss of customer goodwill caused by 
such inventory waste, these losses are significant. Our findings suggest that suppliers—
the principal of SBT contracts—would be willing to pay a certain amount for third-party 
compliance services to ensure that the SBT provisions are properly carried out by the 
retailers or have the retailers assume the cost of shrinkage above the industry average 
level to curb the retailer’s moral hazard.   
Robustness Analyses 
While our data supports our main hypothesis, there is still the possibility that 
these specific findings will depend on our choice of instrumental variable and model 
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specification. Therefore, in this section, we will examine the sensitivity of our results 
with respect to our choice of instrumental variable as well as various model 
specifications. 
 As a means of establishing the robustness of our findings with respect to our 
model specification, we compared our main results from the Tables 3 and 4 (referred to 
as Model 1) with nine different specifications described in Table 5. These alternative 
specifications included uses of different instrumental variables (Model 2-3), different 
ways to control for time (Model 4-6), different product categorizations (Model 7-9), and 
an alternative estimation method (Model 10).  
Model 2 uses the number of stores each supermarket chain runs as the 
instrumental variable, whereas Model 3 uses the total population living across the zip 
codes where each chain’s stores are located as an alternative instrumental variable. Both 
the number of stores and the size of the population across the stores’ zip codes reflect the 
retailers’ market coverage, which might explain their choice of supply chain contract. 
The results from the first-stage probit models of the three-step approach are consistent 
with this causality (each instrument’s effect is statistically significant at p<0.001) and 
provide support for the appropriateness of these instruments. Moreover, both Model 2 
and Model 3 show stronger relationships between supply contract and inventory 
shrinkage for both explicit and non-explicit shrink. The coefficients for the control 
variables show similar patterns as those in our main model’s results.  
Model 4 employs dummy variables that denote which day of the week the 
observation was made, instead of using weekend as the control variable for time.  The 
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results are strikingly similar to the main model. In fact, the other two models, Model 5 
which controls for the month when the observation was made and Model 6 which 
controls for the month as well as weekend versus weekdays, produce similar results. 
Model 7-Model 9 use different categorizations of the bakery products. Although the 
coefficients for Contract are slightly lower than those from the main results, the results 
are comparable to our main model.  
Finally, Model 10 uses a control function (CF) approach based on Heckman’s 2-
step model which is an alternative procedure to Woolridge’s (2002) 3-step approach to 
endogenous dummy variable models9 (Petrin and Train, 2010). The results of the CF 
model are quite similar to the main model not only for our main variable of interest but 
also for the control variables. The selectivity-correction variable is significant for both 
explicit and non-explicit shrink models, confirming the presence of endogeneity.  
Overall, our findings are qualitatively consistent across all the different model 
specifications (see Table 5). Compared to these coefficients, our main results in Section 
5.2 (Model 1) imply a slightly more conservative effect of SBT on shrink, but our 
primary conclusions do not change. That is, our finding that shrink is higher under SBT 




                                                           
9
 The main idea behind the CF approach is to first estimate a model of treatment assignment and 
then use the predicted probability of being assigned to the treatment as a covariate, a selectivity-
correction variable, known as inverse Mill’s ratio. This approach offers an indirect method for 
testing for endogeneity through the statistical significance of the inverse Mill’s ratio. 
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Table 5 
Robustness Analyses: Coefficients of Contract 
 






Description Coeff. Sig. Coeff. Sig. 
Model 1 Main Results (from Table 3 & 4) 0.923 *** 0.701 ** 
Model 2 Instrument = Number of Stores 1.175 *** 1.446 *** 
Model 3 Instrument = Total Population 1.078 *** 1.355 *** 
Model 4 Time Control = Day of Week 0.923 *** 0.701 ** 
Model 5 Time Control = Month 0.923 *** 0.701 ** 
Model 6 Time Control = Month, 
Weekend 
0.923 *** 0.701 ** 
Model 7 Product Control = 6 Categories 0.748 *** 0.549 * 
Model 8 Product Control = 5 Categories 0.902 *** 0.680 ** 
Model 9 Product Control = 2 Categories 0.904 *** 0.677 ** 
Model 10 Estimation = Control Function 0.820 *** 0.692 ** 
 
Coefficient Range 0.748 - 1.175 0.549 - 1.446 
Note: *, **, *** indicate statistical significance of two-tailed tests at 10%, 5%, and 1% 
respectively. 
DISCUSSION  
Our empirical analysis shows evidence that the type of contract (SBT versus 
VMI) does have a significant impact on the level of inventory shrinkage. Controlling for 
product, store-demographic, and time-related factors, SBT contracts contribute to 2.5 
percent and 1.9 percent increases in explicit shrink and non-explicit shrink, compared to 
VMI contracts. Under SBT contracts, suppliers not only become responsible for the non-
explicit shrinkage costs that retailers traditionally absorb under VMI contracts but also 
must absorb higher explicit shrinkage costs relative to those observed under VMI 
contracts. While these are significant losses that affect suppliers directly, they also impact 
retailers indirectly. This is because inventory shrinkage generates lost sale opportunities 
  41 
for retailers. For instance, the 4.4% of combined additional shrinkage due to SBT 
contracts in our results represents an annual loss of $126.44 million in gross margin 
opportunity across bakery retailers in the U.S., which is economically significant10. 
The other two variables which reflect operational factors in the supplier-retailer 
dyad also show significant influence on inventory shrinkage. The outsourcing of in-store 
inventory replenishment to 3PL providers contributes positively to inventory loss, as 
reflected in additional increases in explicit and non-explicit shrink of 0.5 percent and 1.1 
percent, respectively. Moreover, increases in the shelf space volumes assigned to 
inventory at retail stores increase explicit and non-explicit shrink levels by 0.2 percent 
and 1.5 percent, respectively.  
Our findings offer several important managerial implications. First, it is well 
known that suppliers can improve demand forecasting and reduce logistics costs through 
SBT contracts. However, there is a dark side to SBT contracts that is not well understood 
by suppliers. Our findings highlight potential risks suppliers face in SBT contracts by 
examining the inventory shrinkage outcomes in the packaged bakery industry. As 
predicted by Agency Theory, shifting inventory ownership does not simply remove the 
necessity to check-in inventory at the point of delivery, but also creates incentive 
misalignments in the operations of retailers by decoupling the ownership of inventory 
from its management thereby amplifying the amount of inventory shrinkage in the supply 
chain. We suggest that suppliers facing the decision to adopt SBT contracts carefully 
                                                           
10
 According to the Food Marketing Institute (FMI), U.S. bakery sales revenue was $14,367.68 
million in 2011. Assuming 20% average gross margin for packaged bread, the annual total gross 
margin in the U.S. bakery industry is $2,873.54 million. We used this as a basis for our 
calculation. 
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compare the benefits of improved forecasting and reduced logistics costs with the cost of 
inventory shrinkage. Retailers should also be concerned about lost sales opportunities 
their reduced effort brings in the long-run, even though they derive short term benefits 
from transferring the direct costs of shrinkage to their suppliers under SBT.  
Second, suppliers may also need to reevaluate their logistics strategies when 
choosing to adopt SBT contracts. Since, under SBT contracts, suppliers become 
responsible even for the shrinkage generated by 3PL providers, the choice of supply 
contracts and the degree of logistics outsourcing need to be jointly optimized. Moreover, 
when deciding the optimal shelf space volumes allocated to different SKUs, retailers and 
suppliers must consider these volumes’ impact on inventory shrinkage. Academic 
literature on shelf space allocation has focused primarily on its positive effect on sales 
(Desmet and Renaudin, 1998; Dréze, Hoch, and Purk, 1994). The reasoning is that if a 
product occupies a large amount of shelf space, customers will see it more easily and, 
thus, they will be more likely to purchase it. In addition, large amounts of shelf space are 
believed to have promotional effects. The merchandizing adage “pile it high, watch it fly” 
implies that large product quantities placed on shelves can stimulate demand. Our 
findings show that shelf space can also have negative effects on profits through increased 
inventory shrink. These effects are often overlooked in the literature. Our findings also 
highlight the non-linear relationship between shelf space and shrinkage in which the loss 
of inventory is amplified as shelf space volume increases.  
Overall, our findings underscore the importance of supply chain design, and the 
choice of supply contracts in particular, on supply chain performance measured in terms 
of inventory shrinkage. These findings are especially relevant in times when large 
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retailers such as Walmart and Target are implementing SBT contracts with many of their 
food suppliers. These retailers sometimes offer immediate financial incentives to 
suppliers (e.g., wholesale price premiums) to persuade them to adopt SBT contracts. 
Suppliers, however, need to be aware of the potential risk of high shrinkage involved in 
SBT and carefully evaluate the long-term benefit of SBT contracts.  
SBT contracts, when scaled to entire product categories, could eventually 
transform the traditional serial supply chain into a two-sided market where retailers 
become platforms for exchange between suppliers and consumers. When successful, 
these platforms could enjoy numerous benefits from being the bridges between the two 
groups and making profits from both sides (Eisenmann, Parker, and Van Alstyne, 2006). 
Two-sided markets could also benefit the economy by lowering transaction costs for both 
sides (Evans, 2010). If SBT contracts offer retailers such a great opportunity to improve 
their strategic positioning, why wouldn’t retailers care about doing it right? Perhaps, 
retailers are not seeing through the fundamental change SBT contracts will bring about 
and are pushing SBT for the wrong reasons. While shifting the cost of shrinkage to 
suppliers may offer retailers short-term cost savings, such risk may scare away other 
potential SBT suppliers and take away great opportunities from the retailers in the long-
run. 
CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, we present an empirical analysis of the level of inventory shrink 
involving packaged bakery items sold across 40 stores owned by 4 supermarket chains in 
the Northeastern U.S. In our analysis, we focus on the impact of retailer-supplier 
contracts on inventory loss reflected in explicit and non-explicit shrink. Through an 
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econometric analysis of our natural experiment, we find support for our hypotheses that 
supply contract, logistics outsourcing, and shelf space allocation are critical factors 
influencing inventory waste in the grocery sector. Our findings are important to suppliers 
who consider switching from VMI to SBT contracts as the hidden cost of inventory 
shrinkage may outweigh the anticipated benefits of SBT contracts. Our findings also 
provide insights to retailers who should be concerned about the long-term consequences 
of shifting shrink costs to suppliers in light of their potential to become platforms. Our 
study calls for a careful reexamination of emerging contractual forms and management 
practices in light of their potential impact on inventory waste.    
In future work, we hope to build on the empirical findings presented in this paper 
and evaluate how the shift in the inventory ownership involved in SBT contracts 
influences pricing decisions in the supply chain. We expect that, in the face of increased 
financial burden from shrinkage, SBT suppliers are likely to revise their supply decisions 
to optimize their profits. This change in suppliers’ decisions will, in turn, influence 
retailers’ decisions and influence both supplier and retailer profits. Issues such as these 
are difficult to answer completely using field data. Designing normative models of 
optimal inventory decisions under alternative contract forms (e.g., DSD vs. SBT) while 
taking into account shrink implications may allow future researchers to prescribe optimal 
supply chain contracts with respect to profits of individual supply chain members as well 
as overall inventory waste. Further, because SBT contracts appear to offer substantial 
benefits for retailers, despite the potential for greater shrink, we intend to test for whether 
market power considerations are at least partially responsible for the emergence of this 
contract form.   
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CHAPTER 2 
THE IMPACT OF DEMAND UNCERTAINTY ON PERFORMANCE IN SCAN-
BASED TRADING CONTRACTS 
 
ABSTRACT 
In the perishable grocery retail sector, suppliers under traditional vendor-managed 
inventory (VMI) contracts are switching to scan-based trading (SBT) by agreeing to 
retain ownership of their products stocked at retail stores until they are sold to consumers. 
One obvious reason for retailers to defer the ownership of inventory until point of sale 
(POS) is to reduce their investment in inventory purchase. However, with a deferral in 
ownership comes a shift in inventory risk from retailers to suppliers. Since retailers pay 
only for what goes through their POS scanners, their excess inventory as well as 
shrinkage become the suppliers’ responsibility. In this paper, we aim to find explanations 
for the suppliers’ adoption of SBT contracts despite such obvious pitfalls. Using a set of 
stylized game theoretic models involving a retailer and a supplier of a product with 
limited shelf life, we find conditions under which SBT contracts could be beneficial for 
both the retailer and the supplier. We find that, under constant demand, SBT contracts not 
only shift the cost of retail inventory shrinkage to the supplier but also amplify the level 
of retail shrinkage by lowering the retailer’s incentive to exert effort to manage inventory 
compared to VMI contracts. When demand is uncertain, however, the supplier may 
benefit from SBT contracts because it could use the real-time sales information 
accompanying SBT payments to improve demand forecasting and minimize the cost of 
overage and underage. Our numerical examples show that even the presence of slight 
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demand uncertainty can incentivize the supplier’s SBT adoption. These results provide 
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INTRODUCTION 
 In many retail supply chains, vendors retain ownership of their products stocked 
at retail stores until they are sold to consumers. Only when an item is scanned at a retail 
store’s point of sale (POS) by a consumer, does the retailer pay the vendor for the unit 
supplied. This form of supply contract, known as scan-based trading (SBT), is becoming 
increasingly more common these days in the distribution of products with limited shelf 
lives. In the perishable grocery sector, in particular, these contracts are often adopted as 
extensions of vendor-managed inventory (VMI) contracts in which suppliers take full 
responsibility for maintaining inventory at retail locations by determining replenishment 
quantities and delivering the items directly to the stores.  
One obvious reason for a retailer to defer ownership of inventory until the point of 
sale is to shift inventory risk to its supplier. Since the retailer pays only for what goes 
through the POS scanners, the inventory which has yet to be sold becomes the supplier’s 
responsibility. Why would then suppliers be willing to accept such risk? Literature that 
has focused on risks involved in excess inventory has shown that shifting the inventory 
ownership to suppliers (through, for example, a supplier’s full credit returns policy) 
allows retailers to order larger quantities, which can improve sales of the suppliers’ 
products (Pellegrini, 1986). Moreover, such policies may free retailers from competing 
on quantities thereby intensifying price competition among retailers in order to increase 
the sale of these products (Padmanabham and Png, 1997).  
The explanations for shifting inventory ownership from retailers to suppliers 
found in the literature, however, do not explain why a vendor would switch from a VMI 
contract to a SBT contract. Since, under both types of contracts, it is the vendor who 
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determines the replenishment quantity, not the retailer, order sizes may not increase when 
inventory risk is shifted to the supplier. Nevertheless, we do observe suppliers in 
consumer packaged goods’ segments involving bakery and dairy products switching from 
VMI to SBT contracts.  
In this paper, we focus on two distinguishing characteristics of SBT contracts to 
seek an explanation for this phenomenon. First, unlike VMI contracts, SBT contracts 
make suppliers liable for both unsold items and inventory shrinkage at retail stores since 
retailers’ payments to suppliers are based on the amount of products that go through the 
stores’ POS scanners. Therefore, for suppliers, these liabilities originate from two 
sources: uncertainty in customer demand and retailers’ incentives to manage supplier-
owned inventories. Second, invoices under SBT contracts are automatically generated by 
POS records in real-time.  Compared to VMI contracts in which the vendors could gather 
information about retail sales only when they receive inventory replenishment orders in 
bulk from retailers and when retailers return excess inventory back to suppliers, payments 
based on POS data under SBT contracts give suppliers access to sales information 
specific to each product and store real-time. 
This study aims to explain why suppliers would switch from VMI to SBT 
contracts focusing on the above two features of SBT contracts. The setting for this study 
involve the sale of perishable items in which retailers’ inventory rotation effort is a 
critical factor influencing retail shrinkage. We limit our attention to the case of 
exogenous (competitive) market price in order to focus on the dynamics between demand 
uncertainty and inventory shrinkage resulting from SBT contracts. We consider two 
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scenarios, a known demand case and an uncertain demand case, and derive conditions for 
a vendor’s decision to switch from VMI to SBT contracts.  
We find that, under constant demand, SBT contracts not only shift the cost of 
retail inventory shrinkage to the supplier but also amplify the level of retail shrinkage by 
lowering the retailer’s incentive to exert effort to manage inventory compared to VMI 
contracts. Except in extreme cases where SBT contracts decrease suppliers’ marginal cost 
sufficiently to compensate for the cost of shrinkage, suppliers may not prefer SBT to 
VMI contracts. When demand is uncertain, however, we find that suppliers may prefer 
SBT contracts even in the absence of any reduction in the supplier costs because they 
could use the real-time sales information accompanying the payments they receive from 
the retailers in order to improve their demand forecasts. That is, for suppliers, there exists 
a trade-off between forecasting error and retail shrinkage under demand uncertainty and 
even when the risk of retail shrinkage is shifted to the suppliers, the savings from forecast 
improvements could fully compensate the additional cost. These results provide rational 
explanations for suppliers’ decisions to switch from VMI to SBT contracts.  
We also examine two additional forms of SBT contracts which might increase the 
likelihood of suppliers’ acceptance of SBT contracts even in the case of known demand. 
We first examine performance-based SBT contracts, in which the supplier sets wholesale 
prices dependent upon realized shrinkage outcomes. Consistent with the economics 
literature, a performance-based pricing scheme applied to SBT contracts effectively shifts 
the risk of retail inventory shrinkage back to the retailer thereby incentivizing the retailer 
to exert more effort than that under the wholesale price SBT contract. The expected 
profits for the supplier, the retailer, and the supply chain all converge to the levels under 
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the VMI contract in the absence of changes in the supplier’s cost. Thus, any small 
reduction in the supplier’s cost due to SBT contracts will increase the supplier’s 
acceptance of SBT contracts under a performance-based SBT contract. Another (perhaps 
more practical) form of SBT contracts we examine is a risk-sharing contract in which the 
cost of realized retail shrinkage is shared between the retailer and the supplier. 
Intuitively, the performance outcomes of a risk-sharing contract run between those under 
the wholesale price SBT contract and the performance-based SBT contracts. 
Interestingly, however, the expected retail inventory shrinkage decreases with the 
retailer’s share of shrinkage only when the baseline sales (i.e. sales when the retailer 
doesn’t exert any effort) are sufficiently large. Our models do not explain why a supplier 
chooses not to employ these contracts to coordinate the supply chain. We focus here 
simply on the supplier’s decision between VMI and SBT contracts. 
The paper is organized as follows. After reviewing related research in Section 2, 
we present the basic model setting in Section 3 and analyze the supplier’s choice between 
VMI and SBT contracts in the case of known demand. We then consider the effects of 
demand uncertainty in Section 4. In Sections 5 and 6, we examine a performance-based 
and a risk-sharing contract and their impact on the supplier’s decision under known 
demand. In Section 7, we provide a numerical example to offer insights as to when the 
supplier would prefer SBT contracts to VMI contracts. Section 8 concludes this paper 
with a summary and a discussion for future research. 
RELATED RESEARCH 
Coordination in supply chains is an issue that has been studied extensively in the 
past. It is well known that the performance of a decentralized supply chain is generally 
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lower than that in a centralized one because firms in the decentralized supply chain try to 
maximize their own profits instead of the total channel profit. One area of particular 
interest has been the design of contracts between retailers and suppliers in order to 
incentivize them to operate as if they were a centralized firm while seeking their 
individual objectives (Lariviere, 1999; Taylor, 2002). Various types of contracts have 
been offered as a mechanism for supply chain coordination (Cachon, 2003). One such 
contract is a buy-back contract whereby the vendor allows the retailer to return unsold 
inventory (Pasternack, 1985; Lee and Rhee, 2007). Studies on buy-back contracts have 
emphasized the role of vendors’ return acceptance as a mitigating force to the effect of 
double marginalization, which improves the total profits available for the whole supply 
chain (Padmanabhan and Png, 1997; Pellegrini, 1986).  
Other contracts conceptually similar to buy-back contracts involve consignment 
stocks (Figure 3). In these contracts, vendors place inventory at the retailer stores without 
receiving payment until the products are sold to consumers. Studies on consignment 
stock contracts have observed that they differ from buy-back contracts in that inventories 
at retailer stores are owned by the vendors and payment is made only after products are 
sold to consumers (Adida and Ratisoontorn, 2011; Ru and Wang, 2010; Wang, Jiang, and 
Shen, 2004). Our work is closely related to the literature on consignment stock in that we 
also consider the case in which the ownership of inventory at the retailer remains with the 
vendor. However, in our models, we explicitly consider the possibility of inventory 
shrinkage—one that is dependent on the level of retailer effort to care for inventory at the 
stores. In the presence of inventory shrinkage, a consignment contract diverges further 
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from a buy-back contract as the nature of the risks the retailer shifts to the vendor 
changes.  
Another contract mechanism which has received much attention in the literature is 
VMI contracts (Yao and Dresner, 2008). Under VMI contracts, the retailer no longer 
triggers the movement of goods in the supply chain. However, as in traditional wholesale 
contracts, the ownership and the custody of the inventory is transferred from the supplier 
to the retailer when the products arrive at the retailer’s premises (Figure 3). Scholars have 
shown that VMI contracts could improve the efficiency in the supply chain by 
encouraging suppliers to deliver more frequently in smaller lot sizes thereby reducing 
surplus production capacity and excess finished inventory (Waller, Johnson, and Davis, 
1999). VMI contracts have been popularized by Walmart and Proctor & Gamble in the 
late 80s and, since then, these contracts have been widely adopted in the retail industry 
(Bookbinder, Gümüş, and Jewkes, 2010). 
SBT contracts can be seen as a combined use of VMI and consignment contracts 
in that both the inventory replenishment control and the ownership of the inventory at the 
retail store are shifted from the retailer to the supplier (See Figure 3). A number of 
studies have examined the performance of SBT contracts in comparison to that of 
consignment contracts (Gümüş, Jewkes, and Bookbinder, 2008; Hu, Li, and Govindan, 
2014; Ru and Wang, 2010) and traditional wholesale contracts (Ben-Daya et al., 2013). 
While these comparisons are valuable to understand the value of SBT contracts in 
general, they do little to explain why suppliers of perishable grocery items switch from 
VMI to SBT contracts. In this study, we compare the performance of SBT contracts with 
that of VMI contracts, following the evolutionary path in the different forms of contracts 
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in retail supply chains. One study that has compared these two contracts is Chen, Lin, and 
Cheng (2010). In this study, the authors show that suppliers would always prefer SBT 
contracts to VMI contracts whereas the benefits of SBT contracts to retailers are not 
guaranteed. These results, however, appear to be driven by the assumption that suppliers 
set retail prices under SBT contracts while retailers set retail prices under VMI contracts. 
Our models differ from those in Chen, Lin, and Cheng (2010) in that we let the supplier 
decide only wholesale prices under both contracts. Specific model settings used in our 
models are discussed in the next section. 
 
Figure 3. Four Types of Supply Chain Contracts 
 
BASIC SETTING  
We consider a channel with a manufacturer who supplies a product with a limited 
shelf life at a constant marginal cost of m and a retailer that sells the manufacturer's 
product to the consumers at a price of p. Given the price, demand for the product is stable 
at Q. Besides pricing, the retailer's other activities also influence its profit. In particular, 
the retailer's inventory management effort stochastically determines the availability of the 
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product at the store. Since the product is perishable, rotating inventory on the shelf is 
critical in minimizing inventory shrinkage due to spoilage. Moreover, the retailer's effort 
to protect items from being stolen or preventing/correcting inventory misplacement all 
contribute to minimizing inventory shrinkage. When there is not enough inventory to 
meet customer demand, the retailer loses sales opportunities. 
For simplicity, we assume that the manufacturer incurs no fixed cost but a 
constant marginal cost of production while the retailer incurs two types of costs, the 
payment of the wholesale price to the manufacturer and the cost of inventory 
management effort. We assume that both parties are risk-neutral. We use this stylized 
model to study the effect of contract choices on inventory shrinkage and profits. We first 
examine the effect of a supply contract on inventory shrinkage in the simplest setting 
before proceeding to a more general case. In this section, we develop a benchmark 
scenario in which there is no demand uncertainty. 
The channel coordination problem in the benchmark scenario comes from two 
factors: unobservable and costly retailer effort and a shift in the inventory ownership. We 
assume the retailer's inventory management effort is unobservable by the manufacturer. 
That is, the manufacturer does not know exactly how much retailer effort was exerted to 
produce the observed shrinkage outcome and hence, cannot enforce the effort level in the 
contract. The unobservability of the retailer's effort creates channel coordination issues 
consistent with the Moral Hazard problem in the Agency Theory literature. We model 
this uncertainty in a parsimonious fashion. Nevertheless, our model captures key aspects 
of the coordination problem. Inventory shrinkage may be either high (XH) or low (XL). 
There is some baseline probability that the shrinkage will turn out to be low (k) when the 
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retailer exerts no effort at all (i.e., e=0). As the retailer puts increasingly more effort (e) to 
manage (i.e. rotate, organize, and protect) the inventory, the probability of low shrinkage 
increases such that 89-ℎ*: = ;<= = : + 0/ where / ∈ [0,1],  : + 0 ≤ 1, and :, 0 ≥ 0. 
Accordingly, the probability of high shrinkage is given as: 89-ℎ*: = ;E= = 1 − : −
0/. The retailer’s inventory management effort is assumed to have decreasing returns to 
scale as the marginal cost of effort is increasing. Under VMI contracts, the unobservable 
retailer effort is not an issue to the manufacturer because the quantity Q is owned by the 
retailer once delivered to the store. However, under SBT contracts, inventory ownership 
remains with the manufacturer until items are scanned at the stores’ POS and, thus, the 
retailer’s effort becomes relevant to the manufacturer. 
We first present the structure of the game between the retailer and the supplier 
under the basic setting (See Figure 4). In the first stage, the retailer and the manufacturer 
agree on a type of supply contract for a fixed quantity Q. For the purpose of this study, 
we restrict our attention to two types of contracts—VMI and SBT. Under a VMI contract, 
the retailer will pay the manufacturer for the quantity Q when they inventory is delivered 
to the store. That is, the ownership of the inventory is transferred from the manufacturer 
to the retailer at the point of delivery and the retailer becomes responsible for each of the 
units in Q from that point on. Under an SBT contract, in contrast, the retailer will pay the 
manufacturer only for the quantities sold to consumers. In this case, the manufacturer 
bears the cost of inventory shrinkage at the store. Once the contract type is decided, the 
manufacturer sets the wholesale price which is uniform for each unit of Q. Based on the 
contract, the manufacturer supplies the quantity to the retailer’s store and the retailer 
manages the inventory at the store to maximize sales. 
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Figure 4. Sequence of Events: Basic Setting 
 
The following is the summary of notations used in our models: 
Q - constant demand 
p - per unit retail price 
w - per unit wholesale price 
m - per unit manufacturing cost under VMI contracts 
m’ - per unit manufacturing cost under SBT contracts 
e - degree of the retailer's inventory management effort / ∈ [0,1] 
c - cost of full effort s.t. / = 
/&, 
 > 0 
x - inventory shrinkage X ∈9;<, ;E=, 0 < ;< <  ;E < J 
l - increase in probability of ;< when e=1, 0 ∈ [0,1] 
k - baseline probability of ;<  when e=0, : ∈ [0, 1] and : + 0 ≤ 1 
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Wholesale Price Contract under Vendor-Managed Inventory 
 Suppose a retailer and a manufacturer agreed to adopt a VMI contract (Stage 1). 
Under a VMI contract, the retailer purchases Q units of inventory from the supplier at the 
unit price of w. The retailer pays the supplier wQ regardless of the realized amount of 
shrink. The supplier sets the wholesale price w to maximize its expected profit while 
making sure that the retailer has incentive to participate in this contract.  
Supplier's Problem (Stage 2):  
maxN OPQ = R − SJ 
s.t. 3[J − 1 − : − 0/;E − : + 0/;<] − 
/& − RJ ≥ ( 
Retailer's Problem (Stage 3): 
maxT  OPU = 3[J − 1 − : − 0/;E − : + 0/;<] − 
/& − RJ 
We assume that 30;E − ;< − 2
 < 0. That is, there is an optimal level of effort which 
is less than the maximum for the retailer to exert in order to maximize its expected profit 
when it owns the inventory. We solve the sequential game by backward induction. 
Checking the first and the second order conditions for the retailer’s expected profit with 
respect to the effort, the retailer’s optimal effort choice is given by 
/∗ = 30;E − ;<2
  
which is independent of the wholesale price the supplier sets. This result is intuitive: once 
the manufacturer sets the wholesale price w, in the second stage, the retailer’s cost of the 
inventory becomes sunk. Therefore, the retailer’s problem in the third stage becomes 
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 Knowing the retailer’s optimal effort level, the supplier’s optimal wholesale price 
which maximizes its expected profit in the second stage is then given by:  
w∗ = 3[J − 1 − :;E − :;<]J + 3
&0&;E − ;<&4
J − (J  
Assuming that this wholesale price is greater than the manufacturer’s marginal cost, the 
profits of the supplier, the retailer, and the supply chain are given by: 
OPQ = 3[J − 1 − :;E − :;<] + 3&0&;E − ;<&4
 − SJ − ( 
OPU = ( 
OPQZ = 3[J − 1 − :;E − :;<] + 3&0&;E − ;<&4
 − SJ 
Wholesale Price Contract under Scan-Based Trading 
Next, we consider a wholesale price contract under SBT (Stage 1). Under this 
contract, the manufacturer delivers Q units of inventory to the retailer's store. However, 
the supplier gets paid only for the units sold to consumers (not the amount delivered) at 
the unit price of w. The supplier sets the wholesale price w to maximize its expected 
profit while making sure that the retailer has incentive to participate in this contract.  
Supplier's Problem (Stage 2):  
S	[N OPQ = R[J − 1 − : − 0/;E − : + 0/;<] − S′J 
s.t. 3 − R[J − 1 − : − 0/;E − : + 0/;<] − 
/& ≥ ( 
Retailer's Problem (Stage 3): 
maxT  OPU =3 − R[J − 1 − : − 0/;E − : + 0/;<] − 
/& 
Given that the first-order condition for the retailer’s expected profit is concave with 








  59 
/R = 03 − R;E − ;<2
  
which is a decreasing function of the wholesale price the supplier sets in the second stage. 
Intuitively speaking, under an SBT contract, the retailer shifts the cost of inventory 
shrinkage completely to the manufacturer. As a result, the retailer’s sunk cost is turned 
into a variable cost and the marginal revenue for sales decreases to 3 − R.  
Knowing the retailer’s optimal response to the wholesale price, the supplier’s 
optimal wholesale price in the second stage is then given by: 
R∗ = 32 + 
[J − 1 − :;E − :;<]0&;E − ;<&  
Plugging the optimal wholesale price back to the retailer’s response function, the 
retailer’s effort choice is given by the following: 
/∗ = 30;E − ;<4
 − [J − 1 − :;E − :;<]20;E − ;<  
Note that the profit maximizing effort level for the retailer under an SBT contract is 
smaller than that under a VMI contract as the marginal cost of the effort relative to the 
marginal revenue increases.  
Now we need to check the retailer’s participation constraint at the optimal 
wholesale price w∗. 




[J − 1 − :;E − :;<]&40&;E − ;<&  
If OPUw∗ ≥ ( then, the profits of the supplier, the retailer, and the supply chain that 
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[J − 1 − :;E − :;<]&20&;E − ;<& − S′J 




[J − 1 − :;E − :;<]&40&;E − ;<&  




[J − 1 − :;E − :;<]&40&;E − ;<& − S′J 
If OPUw∗ < ( then, the supplier will either choose a wholesale price different from 
w∗ which makes the retailer’s participation constraint binding, but makes the supplier’s 
expected profit even lower than that expressed in equation (19). Or the supplier would 
choose not to participate in the contract if the price that makes the retailer’s participation 
constraint binding gives him a negative expected profit. The retailer will earn ( from the 
contract or elsewhere regardless.  
Under a VMI contract, having one extra unit of inventory available for sales is 
worth the market price 3 since, independent of realized shrinkage, the retailer has to pay 
the manufacturer RJ. However, under an SBT contract, the retailer pays the 
manufacturer only for the quantity sold to the consumers. Therefore, the marginal 
revenue for sales decreases from 3 to 3 − R and the optimal retailer effort decreases. 
Proposition 1 summarizes the impact of SBT contracts on the expected profits of the 
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inventory shrinkage. As we can see, under SBT contracts with no demand uncertainty, 
the retailer’s expected profit increases at the expense of the manufacturer’s profit when 
the manufacturing cost does not change after adopting SBT contracts. Moreover, the 
realized inventory shrinkage is higher under SBT contracts due to the decrease in the 
retailer’s effort.  
 If we assume that SBT contracts reduce manufacturer’s cost by, for example, 
improving logistics efficiency, it is possible that the manufacturer’s profit as well as the 
overall supply chain profit increase under SBT contracts compared to VMI contracts. Our 
aim in presenting the benchmark case is to show the baseline impact of inventory 
ownership transfer to the upstream player on retail inventory shrinkage.  
Proposition 1. When demand is certain and the manufacturer distributes through a 
retailer using a uniform wholesale price, 
(a) OPQ < OPQ: The manufacturer’s expected profit is strictly smaller under SBT 
contracts compared to VMI contracts when the manufacturing cost remains 
unchanged; 
(b) OPQ ≥ OPQ: The retailer’s expected profit is weakly greater under SBT 
contracts compared to VMI contracts given that the price under the SBT 
contract assures the retailer’s participation;  
(c) /∗ < /∗ & O;∗ > O;∗: Retail inventory shrinkage is strictly larger under SBT 
contracts compared to VMI contracts due to the strictly lower retailer effort 
under SBT contracts;  
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(d) OPQZ < OPQZ: The expected profit for the supply chain is strictly lower under 
SBT contracts compared to VMI contracts when the manufacturing cost 
remains unchanged;  
(e) In order for the supplier to prefer SBT contracts to VMI contracts under 
known demand, the manufacturer’s marginal cost should be reduced at least 
by the following amount (a necessary condition): 




[J − 1 − :;E − :;<]&20&;E − ;<&J   
DEMAND UNCERTAINTY 
In the previous section, we considered how SBT contracts influence profits and 
shrinkage outcomes by shifting inventory ownership to the upstream member assuming 
that market demand is known. Let us now consider how the results depend on demand 
uncertainty. To address this issue, we change slightly one assumption made in the basic 
setting. Let retail demand be either JE or J< at price 3 with the probability of JE being 
, 0 <  < 1. We assume that retail price is fixed and  is known. With this simple 
change, we can introduce demand uncertainty in two ways: the range of possible demand 
realizations JE − J< and the probability . The sequence of events under the uncertain 
demand case is shown in Figure 5.  
(22) 
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Figure 5. Sequence of Events: Uncertain Demand Case 
 
Vendor-Managed Inventory 
 The retailer will want to purchase JE units of inventory from the manufacturer in 
case demand turns out to be high and J< units of inventory when demand turns out to be 
low. Before demand uncertainty is resolved, however, the manufacturer needs to decide 
how much to produce. Since the product in question is perishable and the leftover 
inventory has no salvage value, the supplier wouldn’t quite produce JE units under 
demand uncertainty. In the absence of any additional information, the manufacturer 
produces the amount of average demand, Jb ≡ JE + 1 − J< . As a result, in times of 
high customer demand, the amount of inventory the manufacturer is able to supply would 
be limited to Jb. Regardless of the quantity purchased, per unit wholesale price is assumed 
to be uniform. The supplier sets the wholesale price w to maximize his expected profit 
while making sure that the retailer has incentive to participate in this contract.  
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Supplier's Problem (Stage 2):  
maxN OP&Q = R − SJb + 1 − RJ< − SJb 
s.t. 93[Jb − 1 − : − 0/;E − : + 0/;<] − RJb=                                      
+1 − 93[J< − 1 − : − 0/;E − : + 0/;<] − RJ<= − 
/& ≥ ( 
Retailer's Problem (Stage 3): 
maxT  OP&U =  93[Jb − 1 − : − 0/;E − : + 0/;<] − RJb=                                          
+ 1 − 93[J< − 1 − : − 0/;E − : + 0/;<] − RJ<= − 
/& 
Checking the first and the second order condition for the retailer’s expected profit with 
respect to the effort, the retailer’s optimal effort choice is given by 
/&∗ = 30;E − ;<2
  
which is independent of the wholesale price set by the supplier. Knowing the retailer’s 
optimal effort level, the supplier’s optimal wholesale price that maximizes its expected 
profit in the second stage is then given by:  
w&∗ = p − 3[1 − :;E − :;<][&JE + 1 − &J<] + 3
&0&;E − ;<&4
[&JE + 1 − &J<] 
− ([&JE + 1 − &J<] 
Assuming that this price is greater than the manufacturer’s marginal cost, the profits of 
the supplier, the retailer, and the supply chain are given by: 
OP&Q = 3[&JE + 1 − &J< − 1 − :;E − :;<] 
+ 3&0&;E − ;<&4
 − SJb − ( 
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OP&QZ = 3[&JE + 1 − &J< − 1 − :;E − :;<] 
+ 3&0&;E − ;<&4
 − SJb 
Moreover, the expected overage and underage in this case become θ1 − JE − J<. 
Scan-Based Trading with a Single Wholesale Price 
 One of the main incentives for the manufacturers to adopt an SBT contract is the 
access to real-time POS data from the retailer’s store. With these data, the manufacturer 
could improve forecasting and better mitigate demand uncertainty. For simplicity, we 
assume that the manufacturer could perfectly predict the market demand and plan its 
production accordingly under an SBT contract based on the POS data. 
Supplier's Problem (Stage 2):  
maxN OP,Q = 9R[JE − 1 − : − 0/;E − : + 0/;<]−S′JE=
+ 1 − 9R[J< − 1 − : − 0/;E − : + 0/;<]−S′J<= 
s.t. 93 − R[JE − 1 − : − 0/;E − : + 0/;<]= + 
1 − 93 − R[J< − 1 − : − 0/;E − : + 0/;<]= − 
/& ≥ ( 
Retailer's Problem (Stage 3): 
maxT   OP,U = 93 − R[JE − 1 − : − 0/;E − : + 0/;<]=  
+1 − 93 − R[J< − 1 − : − 0/;E − : + 0/;<]= − 
/& 
Under this setting, we find the retailer’s optimal effort choice to be 
/R = 03 − R;E − ;<2
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The optimal wholesale price and the retailer’s effort are analogues to the results 
from section 3 where demand is assumed to be certain. 
R,∗ = 32 + 
[Jb − 1 − :;E − :;<]0&;E − ;<&  
/,∗ = 30;E − ;<4
 − [Jb − 1 − :;E − :;<]20;E − ;<  
If OP,Uw,∗ ≥ (, the profits of the supplier, the retailer, and the supply chain are given 
by: 




[Jb − 1 − :;E − :;<]&20&;E − ;<& − S′Jb 




[Jb − 1 − :;E − :;<]&40&;E − ;<&  




[Jb − 1 − :;E − :;<]&40&;E − ;<& − S′Jb 
 If OP,Uw,∗ < ( then, the supplier will either choose a wholesale price different 
from w,∗ which makes the retailer’s participation constraint binding, but makes the 
supplier’s expected profit lower than that expressed in equation (37). Or the supplier 
would choose not to participate in the contract if the price that makes the retailer’s 
participation constraint binding gives him a negative expected profit. The retailer will 
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 Note that the profit maximizing effort level for the retailer under an SBT contract 
becomes smaller than that under a VMI contract, analogously to the case under no 
demand uncertainty. However, under demand uncertainty, VMI contracts create a 
positive amount of expected inventory overage at the manufacturer due to a lack of 
forecasting accuracy. Moreover, the forecasting inaccuracy creates lost sales opportunity.  
Therefore, there exists a trade-off between overage/underage and retail shrinkage under 
demand uncertainty. Proposition 2 summarizes our findings.  
Proposition 2. When demand is uncertain and the manufacturer distributes through a 
retailer using a uniform wholesale price, 
(a) Even in the absence of any reduction in the manufacturing cost, the 
manufacturer’s expected profit could be higher under SBT contracts compared 
to VMI contracts if the following inequalities hold (sufficient condition): 




[Jb − 1 − :;E − :;<]&202;E − ;<& < ( 




[Jb − 1 − :;E − :;<]&40&;E − ;<& ≥ (; 
(b) OP,Q ≥ OP&Q: The retailer’s expected profit is weakly greater under SBT 
contracts compared to VMI contracts;  
(c) /,∗ < /&∗ & O;,∗ > O;&∗: Retail inventory shrinkage is strictly larger under SBT 
contracts compared to VMI contracts due to a strictly lower retailer effort 
(40) 
(41) 
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under SBT contracts. However, the expected overage and underage for the 
manufacturer decrease from θ1 − JE − J< to zero under SBT contracts; 
(d) OP,QZ ≥ OP&QZ: The expected profit for the supply chain could be higher under 
SBT contracts compared to VMI contracts if the condition (41) and the 
following inequality hold (sufficient condition):  
3[&JE + 1 − &J<] − 33Jb4 − 3[1 − :;E + :;<]4  
+ 3&0&;E − ;<&16
 + 
[Jb − 1 − :;E − :;<]
&
40&;E − ;<& − S − S′Jg ≤ 0; 
(e) A sufficient condition for the manufacturer to prefer SBT contracts to VMI 
contracts under demand uncertainty is that the manufacturing cost is reduced 
by the following amount when condition (41) holds: 
S − Sa = 3[&JE + 1 − &J<]Jb − 32 − 3[1 − :;E + :;<]2Jb
+ 3&0&;E − ;<&8
Jb − 
[J
b − 1 − :;E − :;<]&20&;E − ;<&Jb  
Note that this threshold is lower than the threshold found in Proposition 1(e) 
when we assume Jb = J. 
PERFORMANCE-BASED SBT CONTRACT 
Following Agency Theory’s prescription, the supplier, who is a principal 
delegating the inventory management tasks to the retailer (an agent), may adopt a 
performance-based SBT contract in which he sets the wholesale price dependent on the 
realized shrink outcomes. That is, instead of receiving w for each unit sold, the supplier 
may receive wH per unit sold when the realized shrink is XH and wL when the realized 
(42) 
(43) 
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shrink is XL. Note that the retailer's effort is not observable. However, the shrink outcome 
is an increasing function of the retailer's effort. The supplier will set the two wholesale 
prices to maximize his expected profit while making sure that the retailer has incentive to 
participate in this contract. In this section, we examine the results of a performance-based 
SBT contract assuming that demand is known. 
Supplier's Problem:  
S	[9Nh,Ni= OP4Q = J − ;E1 − : − 0/RE + J − ;<: + 0/R< − S′J 
s.t. J − ;E1 − : − 0/3 − RE + J − ;<: + 0/3 − R< − 
/& ≥ ( 
Retailer's Problem: 
maxT  OP4U = J − ;E1 − : − 0/3 − RE + J − ;<: + 0/3 − R< − 
/& 
Since 0[J − ;E3 − RE − J − ;<3 − R<] − 2
 < 0, we find the retailer’s 
optimal effort choice in this case is given by 
/R< , RE = 0[J − ;<3 − R< − J − ;E3 − RE]2
 . 
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S	[9Nh,Ni,j= k = J − ;E1 − :RE + J − ;<:R<
+ 0&3;E − ;<[J − ;<R< − J − ;ERE]2

− 0&[J − ;<R< − J − ;ERE]&2
 − S′J
+ l mJ − ;E1 − :3 − RE + J − ;<:3 − R<
+ 0&[J − ;<R< − J − ;ERE]&4
 − (n 
Taking partial derivatives of the Lagrangian function with respect to R< , RE, and l and 
setting them equal to zero, we found that l cannot be zero as long as c >  0. Therefore, 
the retailer’s participation constraint must be binding at the optimum. That is:  
J − ;E1 − :3 − RE + J − ;<:3 − R< 
+ 0&[J − ;<R< − J − ;ERE]&4
 = ( 
Noticing that when J − ;<R< = J − ;ERE the retailer’s optimal effort level under 
SBT converges to that under VMI, we find a set of optimal prices that binds the above 
participation constraint.  
R<∗ = J − ;EJ − ;< 1 − :3 + :3 + 0
&;E − ;<&4
J − ;< − (J − ;< 
RE∗ = 1 − :3 + J − ;<J − ;E :3 + 0
&;E − ;<&4
J − ;E − (J − ;E 
Then, the profits of the supplier, the retailer, and the supply chain are given by: 
OP4Q = 3[J − 1 − :;E − :;<] + 3&0&;E − ;<&4
 − S′J − ( 
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OP4QZ = 3[J − 1 − :;E − :;<] + 3&0&;E − ;<&4
 − S′J 
 
Note that, with the outcome-dependent prices, the supplier can assure the same 
amount of expected profit as in the case of VMI. Moreover, the amount of shrink under 
an SBT contract is the same as that under an VMI contract since the amount of retailer’s 
efforts under these two contracts is the same. Under both contracts, the prices are set to 
bind the retailer’s participation constraint and, thus the retailer’s expected profits are the 
same as ( and the supply chain profits become identical. Notice that any reduction in the 
manufacturer’s marginal cost resulting from SBT contract adoption will strictly improve 
the manufacturer’s profit while holding the retailer’s profit, as well as the level of retail 
shrinkage constant. 
Proposition 3. When demand is certain and the manufacturer distributes through a 
retailer using a performance-based pricing scheme based on RE∗  and R<∗ described above, 
(a) OP4Q = OPQ, OP4U = OPU, OP4QZ = OPQZ, /4∗ = /∗ &  O;4∗ = O;∗: The 
expected profits of the supplier, the retailer, and the supply chain converge to 
those under the VMI wholesale price contract and the expected retail 
shrinkage also converges to that under the VMI wholesale price contract when 
the manufacturer’s cost remains unchanged; 
(b) Any reduction in the manufacturer’s marginal cost strictly improves the 
manufacturer’s expected profit while keeping the retailer’s profit and the retail 
shrinkage unchanged.  
 
(54) 
  72 
RISK SHARING CONTRACT  
In reality, there are more than two levels of shrinkage outcomes and, in such 
cases, setting up outcome-dependent prices could easily become impractical. Instead, we 
often observe companies implementing a simpler pricing scheme which involves a 
sharing of realized shrinkage between a retailer and a supplier. Both VMI and SBT 
contracts with single prices could be expressed in terms of the following shrink sharing 
scheme: the retailer pays the supplier R for each unit sold; in addition, the retailer pays a 
penalty of R for each unit of shrinkage, where 0 ≤  ≤ 1. Notice that, when  = 1, the 
contract converges to VMI and, when  = 0, the contract converges to SBT with single 
price. 
We now consider a risk sharing SBT contract where 0 <  < 1. 
Supplier's Problem:  
maxN OPpQ = w[J − 1 − : − 0/;E − : + 0/;<] 
+R[1 − : − 0/;E + : + 0/;<] − m′Q 
s.t. 3 − R[J − 1 − : − 0/;E − : + 0/;<] 
−R[1 − : − 0/;E + : + 0/;<] − 
/& ≥ ( 
Retailer's Problem: 
maxT  OPpU =3 − R[J − 1 − : − 0/;E − : + 0/;<]
− R[1 − : − 0/;E + : + 0/;<] − 
/& 
Given that the first-order condition for the retailer’s expected profit is concave with 
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/R = 0[3 − 1 − R];E − ;<2
  
which is a decreasing function of the wholesale price the supplier sets and an increasing 
function of retailer’s shrink share. 
Knowing the retailer’s optimal response to the wholesale price, the supplier’s optimal 
wholesale price is then given by: 
Rp∗ = 321 −  + 
[J − 1 − 1 − :;E − 1 − :;<]1 − &0&;E − ;<&  
The retailer’s effort choice is given by: 
/p∗ = 30;E − ;<4
 − [J − 1 − 1 − :;E − 1 − :;<]21 − 0;E − ;<  
Now we need to check the retailer’s participation constraint at the optimal 
wholesale price w,∗. We use the following additional notations: Σ ≡ 0&;E − ;<&, Ω ≡
J − 1 − :;E − :;< and Ωa ≡ Q − 1 − 1 − :;E − 1 − :;<. 
OPpURp∗ = 3t2 − 3t
a






1 − u + 
t
a&
41 − &u 
− 3J21 −  − 
t
aJ1 − &u ≥ ( 
If the condition (61) holds, profits of the supplier, the retailer, and the supply chain that 
ensure the retailer’s participation are given by: 





21 − &u − S′J 
OPpU = 3t2 − 3t
a






1 − u + 
t
a&
41 − &u 
− 3J21 −  − 
t
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OPpQZ = 3t2 + 3Ω
a





41 − &u − 
tt
a
1 − u 
− 3J21 −  − 
t
aJ1 − &u − S′J 
Proposition 4 summarizes our findings from the risk sharing contract models. 
Proposition 4. When demand is certain and the manufacturer distributes through a 
retailer using a risk-sharing contract, 
(a) When α = 1 & S = S′, * OPpQ = OPQ, ** OPpU = OPU , *** OPpQZ =
OPQZ  & *w /p∗ = /∗; 
(b) When α = 0 & S = S′, * OPpQ = OPQ, ** OPpU = OPU , *** OPpQZ =
OPQZ  & *w /p∗ = /∗; 
(c) For 0 < α < 1, the manufacturer’s expected profit increases in α and the retailer’s 
expected profit decreases in α; 
(d) For 0 < α < 1, a sufficient condition for the supply chain profit to increase in α 
under condition (61) is 2Ω > Q. 
NUMERICAL EXAMPLES 
 We provide, in this section, a small numerical example in order to gain insights 
about the parametric conditions under which suppliers would prefer SBT contracts to 
VMI contracts. Since suppliers would not prefer SBT contracts without changes in the 
supply cost under known demand, we focus on the uncertain demand case and examine 
how the degree of demand uncertainty as well as parameters related to shrinkage 
influence the supplier’s contract choice with the assumption that the supply cost remains 
unchanged. Specifically, our baseline parameters are the following: 
(64) 
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[θ, QE , Q< , :, 0, XE, X< , 
, 3, S, (, ] = [0.07511, 150, 100, 0.2, 0.6, 45, 10, 200, 20, 4, 70, 
0]. We then evaluate the sensitivity of the supplier’s expected profits under both types of 
contracts to the changes in the following four variables— θ, QE , 0, XE—while holding the 
rest of the parameters fixed at their baseline values. We also evaluate the level of 
retailer’s effort under the two contracts as a function of the four parameters we are 
changing. Figure 6 shows the results.  
 As expected, the supplier’s profits are higher under VMI contracts than those 
under SBT contracts when demand uncertainty is low. Figure 6(a) shows the supplier’s 
profit as a function of θ. When θ is close to zero, the supplier prefers VMI contracts 
because there is little demand uncertainty it can mitigate using the information 
accompanying the payments under SBT contracts. Moreover, as shown in Figure 6(e), the 
retailer’s effort level under SBT contracts are much higher than that under VMI contracts 
which increases the supplier’s burden of inventory shrinkage. Therefore, the supplier 
would want to avoid SBT contracts when demand uncertainty is low. However, Figure 
6(a) shows that even a small amount of demand uncertainty could incentivize the supplier 
to adopt SBT contracts.  
 In Figure 6(b) we evaluate another measure of demand uncertainty, QE − Q<, the 
gap between high and low demand and examine its impact on the supplier’s decision. 
Similar to the case of θ, the supplier prefers VMI contracts when the gap is relatively 
small. As the range of demand uncertainty increases, however, the supplier starts to 
prefer SBT contracts. Again, the retailer’s effort is much higher under VMI contracts 
                                                           
11
 Note that we use a very small value of θ for the baseline case because any larger value of θ 
strongly incentivize the supplier to adopt SBT and make the decision insensitive to other 
parameters. 
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relative to SBT contracts at the baseline parameter values and the levels are insensitive to 
demand uncertainty.  
 Figure 6(c) shows how the supplier’s profit changes as the probability l changes 
from 10% to 80%. The probability denotes how the inventory shrinkage levels are 
sensitive to the retailer’s effort. As expected, in the presence of slight demand 
uncertainty, the supplier prefers an SBT contract when the retail shrinkage levels are 
insensitive to retailer’s effort. However, as the sensitivity of retail shrinkage to the 
retailer’s effort increases, the supplier starts to prefer VMI contracts. Figure 6(g) shows 
another finding. Not only is the level of retailer effort higher under SBT contracts 
compared to VMI contracts, the gap also increases as l increases.  
 Lastly, Figure 6(d) evaluates the supplier’s contract choice as a function of XE −
X<, the gap between high and low shrinkage outcomes. Similar to the previous case, we 
expect that the supplier will prefer SBT contracts when the gap is small thereby shielding 
itself from the retailer’s moral hazard. Even though we do find this result, the difference 
in the supplier’s profit was very small, despite the fact that shrinkage is highly dependent 
on the retailer’s effort at the baseline (i.e. l=60%). As XE − X< increases, the benefit of 
SBT contracts coming from mitigating demand uncertainty starts to erode. An interesting 
observation is that even though supplier profits under VMI and SBT were not much 
different in Figure 6(d), the levels of retailer effort under VMI and SBT are starkly 
different in Figure 6(h). Examining the optimal wholesale prices under the two contracts, 
we find that the supplier’s ability to set the wholesale price in our Stackaberg game 
allows it to offset much of the additional shrink cost it is liable for under SBT contracts.  
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Figure 6. Numerical Examples 
  
DISCUSSION 
 In Sections 3-6, we examined stylized models of VMI and SBT contracts under 
various assumptions. When demand is known, we can see that a wholesale price contract 
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based on SBT will shift the cost of retail inventory shrinkage to the manufacturer thereby 
lowering the retailer’s effort to manage inventory compared to VMI contracts. The shift 
in the cost of shrinkage not only hurts the manufacturer’s profit but also generates 
inventory shrinkage amounts higher than the ideal level for the supply chain. In order for 
the wholesale price at the SBT contract to be profitable for both the supplier and the 
retailer, the manufacturer’s marginal cost should be sufficiently lowered to compensate 
for the cost of shrinkage. Nevertheless, inventory waste due to retail shrinkage under the 
SBT contract is inevitably high compared to the VMI contract even when the 
manufacturer’s cost is lowered.  
 With performance-based SBT contracts, the manufacturer can effectively shift the 
risk of inventory shrinkage back to the retailer thereby incentivizing the retailer to exert 
more effort than that under the wholesale price SBT contract. The expected profits for the 
manufacturer, the retailer, and the supply chain all converge to the levels under the VMI 
contract when the manufacturer’s cost remains unchanged. Any reduction in the 
manufacturer’s cost, however, will strictly improve the manufacturer’s and the supply 
chain’s expected profits without additional inventory shrinkage.  
 When a performance-based contract is not feasible, a risk-sharing SBT contract in 
which the cost of realized retail shrinkage is shared between the retailer and the 
manufacturer can also be a practical way to reduce the burden of the manufacturer when 
adopting SBT contracts. Intuitively, the manufacturer’s expected profit under the risk-
sharing SBT contract is increasing in the retailer’s share of inventory shrinkage and the 
retailer’s expected profit is decreasing in it. Interestingly, however, the expected retail 
inventory shrinkage decreases with the retailer’s share of shrinkage only when the 
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baseline sales (Ω) is sufficiently large (2Ω > Q. This is the case where the baseline 
shrinkage (i.e. shrinkage at / = 0) is small relative to the avoidable shrinkage, 0;E −
;<, given the fixed demand J. That is, when the relative size of the avoidable shrinkage 
is large, assigning the retailer with increasingly more responsibility for shrinkage reduces 
the shrinkage outcome. The expected profit for the supply chain is non-monotone in α. 
We find, however, that when the baseline sales are sufficiently large (√2Ω ≥ Q, an 
increase in the retailer’s share of shrink benefits the supply chain as well. 
 When demand is uncertain, the profit maximizing effort level for the retailer 
under an SBT contract becomes smaller than that under a VMI contract. This is 
analogous to the case under demand certainty. However, under demand uncertainty, VMI 
contracts create inventory waste from inventory overage at the manufacturer due to a lack 
of forecasting accuracy. This amount of manufacturing waste can be eliminated under 
SBT contracts through the effective use of the real-time sales information. Moreover, 
retail stock-outs can also be minimized using the sale information. Therefore, there exists 
a trade-off between forecasting inaccuracy and retail shrinkage under demand 
uncertainty. What this means is that, even in the absence of any reduction in the 
manufacturing cost, the manufacturer’s expected profit could be higher under SBT 
contracts compared to VMI contracts which could support our observation in the grocery 
retailing sector. Although we do not examine the performance-based and the risk-sharing 
contract under demand uncertainty, we can easily see that these contracts would further 
increase the manufacturer’s incentive to adopt SBT contracts under demand uncertainty 
because they would lower overage and decrease the burden of retail shrinkage relative to 
VMI contracts. 
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 The findings of this study have several important implications. First, despite the 
negative sentiment expressed by industry experts regarding supply chain initiatives led by 
powerful retailers, SBT adoption can be a valuable choice for manufacturers interested in 
reducing demand uncertainty and lowering their manufacturing costs. Whether SBT 
contracts are beneficial only for the retailers’ bottom-line in practice, however, is a 
question that must be addressed empirically. Second, our study shows that even when 
SBT contracts can theoretically benefit both the supplier and the retailer, the supply chain 
may operate more efficiently when the retailer shares the cost of retail shrinkage with the 
supplier thereby reducing inventory loss and improving sales. Nevertheless, we rarely 
observe retailers sharing the cost of shrinkage in practice. By sharing shrinkage with the 
supplier, retailers could incentivize more suppliers to adopt SBT contracts and, perhaps, 
negotiate a better wholesale price based on the benefits achieved by the supplier. Third, 
even though SBT contracts are most commonly adopted for perishable groceries in 
retailing, items with very high demand uncertainty but with very low perishability may be 
good candidates for SBT contracts. For example, the use of SBT for inventory involving 
slow moving items, such as obscure maintenance service parts, which are essentially non-
perishable could offer mutual benefits to the retailer and the supplier.  
LIMITATION AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
 Our goal in this paper is to explain why manufacturers would switch from VMI to 
SBT contracts. To that end, we relied on mathematical modeling to compare performance 
outcomes of the two contracts. Although our models are parsimonious and relevant, we 
relied on key modeling assumptions in their construction that contributed to their 
tractability. In particular, we treated the market price to be exogenous in our discussions 
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of VMI and SBT contracts. This enabled us to focus on the dynamics between wholesale 
price and retail effort. Also, uncertainty in shrinkage, as well as in demand in Section 4, 
were captured using binary states. These assumptions may over-simplify reality. Future 
research could relax our modeling assumptions to include an endogenous market price 
and a continuous and probabilistic distribution of demand as a function of price in order 
to verify whether the results hold under more general assumptions.  
 Taking our research even further, we could model SBT contracts as two-sided 
markets in which a retailer works as the platform that connects suppliers and different 
consumer groups. Since the retailer’s profit relies on attracting more vendors on the 
supplier side (which will lead to more customers to use the platform), the externalities 
among the suppliers could influence the retailer’s optimal effort choice and the resulting 
profits for the parties involved. The simplest way we could examine this effect would be 
to consider two suppliers where the probability of the second supplier joining the SBT 
platform depends on the existing supplier’s shrinkage outcome.  
 Another potential way to extend our research is to test the implications of our 
models empirically. The best way to compare performance implications of the two 
contracts empirically is to conduct an interrupted time series (ITS) analysis for a supplier-
retailer dyad that has recently switched from a VMI to an SBT contract. ITS analysis 
would allow for the estimation of changes in different outcomes after the switch in 
contracts through the use of longitudinal data covering a period before and after this 
change (Kontopantelis et al., 2015). The analysis would account for any existing trends 
prior to the shift from VMI to SBT and would help make stronger causal inferences about 
the impact of this policy change. The analysis can serve to test whether (i) shrink levels 
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are higher under SBT contracts compared to VMI contracts and whether (ii) demand 
uncertainty is better mitigated under SBT contracts compared to VMI contracts.  
Shrink levels could be measured explicitly using supplier credits or estimated 
implicitly by counting the difference between supply and sale over a product’s shelf life. 
Mitigation of demand uncertainty could be measured in various ways. One potential 
measure is a stock-out rate. According to Corsten and Gruen (2003), one of the major 
reasons for stock-outs is insufficient order quantities at retail stores. If a supplier has 
access to daily POS data to improve forecasting under SBT contracts, these 
insufficiencies in order quantities may be corrected and stock-out rates will decrease after 
switching from VMI to SBT contracts (Lee, 2002).  
We propose a primary data collection approach based on a field observation of 
on-hand inventory levels before and after the contract switch. For feasibility, we will 
focus on a single supplier and select SKUs at a single store that is planned to go through a 
VMI to SBT conversion in the near future. For these SKU, we will observe occurrences 
of zero on-hand inventory (i.e., product unavailability) three weeks before and after the 
conversion as a measure of stock-out. If we know what time of the day the supplier 
replenishes the store, we could measure the on-hand inventory levels just before the 
replenishment. Additionally, we could monitor these SKUs’ on-hand levels two more 
times a day in 8-hour intervals to add precision to our inventory level estimates. We can 
take pictures of the shelves at the store and convert the images to numbers or use image 
analytics services such as the one provided by Trax Image Recognition (see 
www.traxretail.com). By having three data points per day, we could estimate both the 
occurrence and the length of stock-out. 
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Admittedly, our comparison of stock-out rates before and after the contract 
conversion is not a perfect test of the supplier’s ability to mitigate demand uncertainty 
because increased shrink could aggravate stock-out rates. However, if the shrink levels 
are indeed higher after switching to an SBT contract yet the stock-out rates are lower, our 
comparison of stock-out rates will serve as a critical test of our second hypothesis.  
 This work serves as a first step explaining the adoption of SBT contracts among 
grocery suppliers. Armed with a better understanding of SBT contracts and their 
implications, we could perhaps envision newer designs of supply contracts to improve 
coordination of decentralized supply chains. 
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CHAPTER 3 
NEGOTIATING WITH GIANTS: THE IMPACT OF BARGAINING POWER AND 
THE MITIGATING ROLE OF SERVICE CONCESSION 
 
ABSTRACT 
 While researchers agree that a firm’s power gives it a leverage to obtain favorable 
outcomes in a negotiation, they do not provide a prescription for a weaker party to 
mitigate the influence of a powerful opponent at the bargaining table. This study 
examines what weaker parties can do to mitigate powerful opponents’ influence and 
reorient the bargaining process to achieve more desirable outcomes. To that end, we first 
conceptually distinguish the objective aspect of power—one that arises from dependency 
created by hard resources bargaining parties have—from the subjective aspect of 
power—one that is shaped by perceptions of dependency which can be manipulated by 
bargaining tactics. We then argue that perceptions of bargaining power, initially set at the 
outset of a negotiation, can be reshaped in the bargaining process through concession 
tactics. We test our hypothesis via a behavioral experiment in the context of contract 
negotiations between retailers and suppliers in a distribution channel. Our results show 
that, while powerful retailers do tend to have the upper hand in negotiations, weak 
vendors could ameliorate or even overcome the influence of retailer power by offering 
services as a concession and as a bundle with the products that they supply. In so doing, 
vendors may improve the value of their offerings in the eyes of retailers. This study 
highlights the subjective and manipulative aspects of bargaining power and provides 
implications for bargaining strategies for power-deprived parties. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Power is a fundamental force in any interaction. From interpersonal interactions 
to interfirm relations, power plays a vital role. While various definitions of power exist, 
scholars across disciplines seem to agree that the essence of power lies in one party’s 
ability to cause another party to do something that it would not have done otherwise 
(Mintzberg, 1983). In the study of channel relationships, scholars have long been 
interested in the unequal distribution of power between a buyer and a supplier and in the 
conflicts that result from such power imbalance. In 2001, for example, Bloom and Perry 
observed that the largest U.S. retailer, Walmart, had pressured its suppliers financially 
using its power. As a result, they found evidence that Walmart’s smaller suppliers 
exhibited a poorer financial performance when compared to suppliers working with other 
retailers. More recently, concerns have emerged about how retailers such as Amazon.com 
have abused their excess monopsony power to squeeze their suppliers (Krugman, 2014). 
In some cases, powerful retailers have put suppliers at a disadvantage by disrupting the 
suppliers’ sales in subtle ways when suppliers disagree with the retailers’ terms 
(Streitfeld, 2014) 
Where does power come from? An important assumption of the channel 
relationship literature is that interorganizational power is based on dependencies. 
Formalized by Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) in their development of Resource Dependence 
Theory, scholars in this stream of research argue that the resources an organization 
possesses or has access to provide it with the capacity to influence other organizations 
that desire those resources (Emerson 1962). Scholars have used several metrics to 
evaluate resource dependency. These include firm size (Provan, Beyer, and Kruytbosch, 
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1980), business volume (Frazier, 1983), market leadership (Blau, 1964), and network 
centrality (Brass and Burkhardt, 1993). Implicit in these metrics of dependency is the 
view that power relationship is a static concept and it is difficult to change the power 
relationship in the short-term.  
Another assumption is that power in a dyadic relationship is an objective concept 
that can be unequivocally measured (Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003). According to Perrow, 
(1970), the distribution of power in a relationship is a function of the allocation of 
objective resources between the parties in the relationship and is reflected in the 
structural dependency of one party on another. Nevertheless, Adler and Silverstein (2000) 
have observed that negotiations are prevalent between parties even when there is a 
seemingly asymmetric power distribution between them. This implies that there may be 
more to bargaining power than the structural dependency created by objective resources 
between two parties. There may be a way for the weaker party in a relationship to 
mitigate the dominant force of the stronger party and reorient the bargaining process to 
achieve more favorable outcomes. 
In this study, we seek strategies based on subjective aspects of bargaining power 
for parties in power-disadvantaged positions, a topic that has not received much attention 
in the literature. To that end, we first conceptually distinguish the objective aspect of 
power—one that arises from dependencies created by hard resources owned by 
bargaining parties—from the subjective aspect of power—one that is shaped by 
perceptions of dependency which can be manipulated by tactics during the bargaining 
process. We then argue that the perception of bargaining power, initially set at the outset 
of the negotiation, can be reshaped in the bargaining process through service concession 
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tactics. Drawing on two alternative views of service concession making, namely 
impression management theory and service-dominant (S-D) logic, we postulate two 
competing propositions about how service concession shapes the relationship between 
power and bargaining outcomes.   
We test our hypotheses via a behavioral experiment in the context of contract 
negotiations in a retail distribution channel. Our results support the S-D logic’s view of 
service concession making. They show that while powerful retailers do tend to have the 
upper hand during negotiations, weak suppliers could ameliorate or even overcome the 
influence of retailers’ power by offering services as concessions. The results from the 
experiments show that service concessions, when properly bundled with the core 
products being negotiated, can improve perceived value of the offerings and generate 
greater dependency by retailers on suppliers. Moreover, the results suggest that services 
that offer immediate and concrete benefits turn out to be more effective in overcoming 
retailer power than those with long-term abstract benefits. Through these results, our 
study highlights the subjective and manipulative aspects of bargaining power and 
provides tactical advice for power disadvantaged parties during negotiations. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we review 
relevant theory and establish our research propositions. In Section 3, we explain our 
experiment setting, the operationalization of power and service concession, and our 
hypotheses. Section 4 presents the results of the experiment. Section 5 discusses the 
implications of the results. Section 6 concludes by discussing our study’s limitations and 
future research directions.  
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THEORY 
Organizations differ in their resources and such heterogeneity in resource 
allocation creates dependency among organizations. Organizations that have scarce and 
critical resources will generally have advantages over other organizations that desire 
those resources (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). In a dyadic relationship, the extent to which 
an organization is dependent on its partner firm may not necessarily be the same as the 
extent to which the partner firm is dependent on the organization (Emerson, 1962). When 
an organization is relatively more dependent on its exchange partner, it gives its partner 
more power to influence it. The larger the asymmetry in the dependence between two 
organizations, the greater the power the partner firm has over the other firm (Casciaro 
and Piskorski, 2005).   
While this form of resource dependence is a central construct in understanding 
interorganizational relationships in the abstract, it is insufficient to predict particular 
bargaining outcomes because bargaining is an inherently social process between human 
actors. Human bargainers often show deviations from rationality because they are 
cognitively limited (Pruitt and Rubin, 1986). In that regard, bargaining is a cognitive 
process through which bargainers select, interpret, and infer information presented to 
them throughout the course of their bargaining process (Hammond et al. 1975). 
Therefore, bargainers may subjectively interpret objective conditions when they translate 
cues from the environment about their opponents and the situation into usable 
information at the bargaining table.  
Bargaining is also a process of social interaction in which bargainers act and react 
to their adversaries’ actions. In that sense, Bacharach and Lawler (1981) viewed 
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bargaining as a “game of managing impression” through information manipulation 
(p.42). A bargainer’s ultimate mission is then to manipulate his opponent’s perceptions of 
his power through various tactics in order to achieve his goal. This subjective and tactical 
view of bargaining power provides the weaker bargaining party an opportunity to 
maneuver the negotiation towards more favorable outcomes (Kim, Pinkley, and Fragale 
2005; Lewicki and Robinson, 1998; Shapiro and Bies, 1994). 
Once we view bargaining as a process of social interaction between two entities 
with bounded rationality, it is possible to picture a series of concessions and counter-
concessions going back and forth between two parties with asymmetric resource 
dependencies. Extant literature on concession-making views concessions as part of an 
outcome variable. Studies in this stream of research generally agree that when power 
imbalances exist, the weaker party tends to make more concessions and, consequently, 
obtains smaller outcomes relative to the powerful party (Giebels, De Dreu, and Van de 
Vliert, 2000; Pinkley, Neale, and Bennett, 1994; for a review, see Pruitt and Carnevale, 
1993).  
However, concessions are not only outcomes but also critical inputs to bargaining 
through which participants communicate their positions and attitudes (Bacharach and 
Lawler, 1981). As such, concession making offers also an opportunity for one party to 
manipulate its opponent’s perception regarding its bargaining power. Can a weaker party 
make concessions as a bargaining tactic in order to mitigate the impact of power 
imbalance? According to impression management perspectives, bargainers can infer their 
opponents’ aspirations based on their concession behaviors. If a bargaining party makes 
little or no concessions, its opponent will ascribe a strong image and a high level of 
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aspirations to the bargaining party and, in response, the opponent will lower its aspiration 
level and make more concessions (Siegel and Fouraker, 1960). From this perspective, the 
perception of one’s level of aspiration becomes a particularly important target of 
manipulation at the negotiation table. The old adage “give someone an inch and they'll 
take a mile” expresses this perspective and stresses the need for bargainers to look strong. 
In a bargaining context with power imbalance, if the weaker party makes concessions, 
then the opponent’s perception of the weaker party’s aspirations may be reinforced and 
may further heighten the opponent’s level of aspirations. Thus, concessions made by the 
weaker party may create a vicious cycle by reinforcing the gap in the dependencies. This 
view of concession making is closely related to the zero-sum approach to bargaining 
where the bargaining process is considered a purely distributive game which focuses on 
the relative power between the bargaining parties (Pinkley. Griffith, and Northcraft, 
1995).  
However, the impact of concession making could also be understood from an 
alternative perspective in which power is rooted in the possession of valued resources 
(Emerson, 1962). Focusing on the value of concessions made by the bargainer rather than 
the impression made by the act of concession making itself, one may argue that the power 
imbalance, perceived prior to the bargaining process, could be adapted to the extent that 
the bargainer’s concession influences the opponent’s perception of the value of 
bargainer’s resources. How can concessions change the perceived value of one’s 
resources? According to S-D logic, resources are inherently value-neutral and the value 
of tangible resources is realized only when they deliver useful services to users (Vargo 
and Lusch, 2004). Hence, any additional services that can facilitate the process of value 
  91 
realization could improve the perceived value of the resources provided by the party 
offering these services. In the context of power imbalance, by making service 
concessions that could enhance the overall value of the offerings being exchanged, the 
weaker party could manipulate its bargaining power, as perceived by its opponent, and 
achieve a more favorable outcome than what would be feasible in the absence of such 
concession.  
These arguments point to a definite impact of relative structural power on 
bargaining outcomes. This is summarized in Proposition 1 below. However, they also 
point to two competing effects, summarized in Proposition 2a and 2b below, regarding 
the impact of concession making on the bargaining outcomes. Our goal is to test these 
propositions empirically through the use of a bilateral negotiation experiment. 
 
Proposition 1: A bargainer’s relative structural power negatively influences its 
opponent’s bargaining outcome. 
Proposition 2a: By offering a service concession, a bargainer adds to the negative impact 
of its opponent’s relative power on its outcome. 
Proposition 2b: By offering a service concession, a bargainer offsets the negative impact 
of its opponent’s relative power on its outcome. 
 
EXPERIMENT 
We conducted a bilateral negotiation experiment to examine the effects of relative 
structural power and supplier concession making on bargaining outcomes. The design of 
the experiment involved relative power and supplier concession as within-subject factors. 
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The context of the bargaining was a negotiation of a scan-based trading (SBT) contract 
between a grocery retailer and a milk supplier. SBT contracts are emerging alternatives to 
vendor-managed inventory (VMI) contracts where suppliers make inventory 
replenishment decisions at retail stores and maintain ownership of this inventory until 
products are sold to consumers (Kinsey, 1999). SBT contracts provide a particularly 
relevant context for studying negotiation because the decoupling of inventory ownership 
from control creates additional opportunities for incentive misalignment, which requires a 
more careful approach to bargaining especially from the weaker party’s perspective. 
Literature on SBT contracts have mainly focused on comparing performance implications 
of SBT contracts with those of more traditional types of contracts using mathematical 
modeling and, in so doing, assumed away the role of particular power and negotiation 
dynamics in these relationships (Ben-Daya et al., 2013; Gümüş, Jewkes, and Bookbinder, 
2008; Ru and Wang, 2010). Our examination of the impact of bargaining power and 
bargaining tactics on the distribution of outcomes under SBT contracts seeks to address 
this deficiency in the literature. We ground our experiment in the bargaining between a 
grocery retailer and a milk supplier where SBT contracts are frequently observed in 
practice.  
The negotiation of the SBT contract in the experiment involved two specific 
parameters, the wholesale price of milk and the retailer’s share of inventory shrink costs 
at the retailer’s stores. The share of inventory shrink costs between retailers and suppliers 
is a particularly important negotiation aspect in SBT contracts not only because it can be 
used as a tool to distribute the cost of inventory shrinkage between the retailer and the 
supplier but also because it can potentially influence the amount of total shrinkage by 
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adjusting the retailer’s incentives to manage SBT inventories at its stores. In order to 
ensure that our bargaining context closely resembles actual practice, we allowed 
participants to bargain over the shrink share along with the wholesale price 
simultaneously instead of providing them with an exogenous contract price. The main 
dependent variable was the total payoff from the bargaining which was the sum of the 
payoffs from their agreements on the two parameters above.  
Participants 
We recruited a total of 152 undergraduate business students from Arizona State 
University. These students received course credits in exchange for their participation in 
the experiment. We deemed the use of student subjects to be appropriate for this study 
because the study focuses on general behavioral patterns related to tactics and perceived 
power (Knemeyer and Naylor, 2011). Since we are not interested in measuring actual 
decision makers’ preferences but rather fundamental human processes, recruiting 
working professional is not required. Rather, working professionals’ experience in SBT 
could be considered counter-productive for the purpose of our study since their 
preexisting knowledge (e.g., relational dynamics with existing SBT partners) may render 
the experimental priming ineffective. To ensure external validity while avoiding 
unnecessary bias from experience, we recruited only students who had taken or were 
taking relevant coursework in areas such as Purchasing Management or Negotiation. 
Recruiting such qualified students ensured that the participants had enough fundamental 
knowledge about the phenomenon of interest (Biyalogorsky, Boulding, and Staelin, 
2006).  
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Manipulation of Treatment Variables 
Drawing from the classical bargaining theory, we manipulated relative structural 
power using disagreement payoffs, namely the payoff each party will receive when 
negotiation fails to reach an agreement (Nash, 1950, 1953; Pinkley, Neale, and Bennett, 
1994; Tripp and Sondak, 1992). These values reflect the availability of alternative options 
each bargaining party has. Therefore, the larger the value of a party’s disagreement 
payoff, the less dependent it becomes on its bargaining counterpart. The difference 
between a party’s disagreement payoff and its counterpart’s represents the bargaining 
party’s relative power derived from the structure of the resource distribution. The relative 
structural power construct has three levels: retailer-powered, balanced-power, and 
supplier-powered conditions. In the retailer-powered condition, the retailer would receive 
$40,000 whereas the supplier would earn nothing when the negotiation fails. This means 
that the retailer is relatively less dependent on the supplier and, consequently, has more 
power. In the balanced-power condition, both the retailer and the supplier would earn 
$20,000 each. Therefore, they are equal in structural power. In the supplier-powered 
condition, the supplier would earn $40,000 while the retailer would receive nothing. This 
condition reflects the case in which the supplier has relative structural power. Note that, 
in all conditions, the sum of the bargainers’ disagreement payoffs was held constant at 
$40,000 to avoid any confounding effect resulting from different levels of absolute 
dependence (in contrast to the relative dependence). In measuring the structural and 
objective element of dependence, we, thus, strictly focus on the relative power.  
 We also incorporated different forms of service concession offered by the 
supplier: no service, inventory audit service, and sales analytics report service. Each of 
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these service forms was exogenously given in each of the negotiation rounds. Among all 
possible services to offer as a concession, we choose inventory audit services and sales 
analytics report services because these auxiliary service forms can be introduced as 
concessions without shifting the focus of the negotiation away from its main parameters 
(wholesale price and inventory shrink share). Our choice of these two particular types of 
services was grounded in our desire to evaluate whether the value perspective of 
concession making (Proposition 2b) holds true and, if so, how different types of services 
will have different effect on bargaining outcomes. We choose inventory audits to 
represent a type of service with immediate short-term benefits. Since SBT contracts 
eliminate daily inventory check-ins, inventory audits have great complementary value for 
retailers who will be in need of objective inventory data to save costs. In contrast, 
services involving sales analytics reports provide greater long-term benefits to retailers as 
cumulative knowledge of consumers’ purchasing patterns would help retailers rationalize 
shelf space and product assortments to improve overall sales. Nevertheless, such benefits 
may take relatively longer to realize, and there may not be immediate monetary benefits 
derived from them. If service concessions do improve the supplier’s bargaining outcome 
by altering the perceived power dependence, services which differ in their salient values 
may have a different impact on the outcome. Specifically, we suspect inventory audit 
services to have a stronger effect on the supplier’s payoffs because their benefits are more 
immediate and, hence, brought to the mind of the retailers more readily (Ratneshwar et 
al., 1997). We do not attach particular costs to these services even though one could be 
costlier for the supplier to offer than the other. We believe that attaching dollar values to 
these costs could artificially force specific bargaining outcomes. Since we are focusing 
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on the perceived values of these services by the retailer, we believe that the results would 
be more meaningful without explicit costs. Of course, the implicit assumption here is that 
the supplier would not offer services that are so costly that they would offset the effect of 
mitigated power completely. 
 Based on our operationalization of relative structural power and supplier 
concession making, we can restate our research propositions into the following testable 
hypotheses. Specifically, Hypothesis 1 tests Proposition 1; Hypothesis 2a and 2a’ test 
Proposition 2a using inventory audit services and sales analytics services, respectively; 
and Hypothesis 2b and 2b’ test Proposition 2b using these two service concessions 
 
Hypothesis 1: Retailers’ relative structural power negatively influences suppliers’ total 
bargaining payoffs. 
Hypothesis 2a: Under a given level of relative structural power, offering inventory audit 
services as a bargaining concession negatively influences suppliers’ total bargaining 
payoffs compared to the case when no service is offered.  
Hypothesis 2a’: Under a given level of relative structural power, offering sales analytics 
services as a bargaining concession negatively influences suppliers’ total bargaining 
payoffs compared to the case when no service is offered.  
Hypothesis 2b: Under a given level of relative structural power, offering inventory audit 
services as a bargaining concession positively influences suppliers’ total bargaining 
payoffs compared to the case when no service is offered.  
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Hypothesis 2b’: Under a given level of relative structural power, offering sales analytics 
services as a bargaining concession positively influences suppliers’ total bargaining 
payoffs compared to the case when no service is offered. 
 
Procedure 
To conduct the bilateral negotiation experiment, we randomly grouped the 152 
participants into 76 pairs. The participants in each of these pairs played the role of either 
the retailer or the supplier. Each pair of participants was seated at a table at some distance 
apart from other pairs. Initially, the participants in each pair were given a script which 
contained general information about the SBT contract and the terms being negotiated. 
The script also contained instructions about each participant’s role, their tasks, and the 
negotiation procedure as well as charts that showed their private payoffs as a function of 
their choices of the wholesale price and the shrink share (See Appendix A12). The 
preferences for the two parameters were structured completely opposite for the two 
parties such that the retailer prefers lower wholesale prices while the supplier prefers high 
wholesale prices and, similarly, the retailer prefers to have no share of shrink cost while 
the supplier prefers the retailer to be responsible for the entire share of the shrink cost. 
Participants were not allowed to show their private payoff charts to their bargaining 
partners.  Such information was only allowed to be discovered by communication in the 
negotiation process. 
                                                           
12
 Our experiment was designed based on the script kindly provided by Professor Simon Gaechter 
at the University of Nottingham. Although the nature of our experiment differs from his, his 
script helped us greatly in building our own script. The design of our payoff chart drew on 
valuable comments from Professor Thomas M. Tripp at Washington State University-Vancouver 
and his seminal paper, Tripp and Sondak (1992).   
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Once the participants in each pair had a chance to read the script about the 
bargaining experiment, they were given 30 minutes to complete nine rounds of 
bargaining tasks (a full factorial design involving three levels of relative structural power 
and three levels of service concession). The bargaining took place face-to-face with each 
round of negotiation limited to a three-minute duration. When no agreement was made 
within the three-minute window for any round of negotiation, an impasse was declared 
and the subjects were to earn the payoff values described as their respective disagreement 
payoffs for that round. During this phase, the participants could freely communicate each 
other’s preferences and exchange offers. To motivate the participants’ involvement in the 
task, the script indicated that each of the participants will earn course credits based on 
their achievements from the bargaining. Specifically, 45 points were promised for 
participants whose payoffs were above the average and 15 points were offered for those 
whose payoffs were below the average. These points were equivalent to 4.5% and 1.5% 
of their final grade, respectively. To avoid non-agreement, no points were offered for 
those who did not complete all the rounds of the negotiation. Upon completion of the 
bargaining tasks, the subjects were asked to fill out a questionnaire about their 
sociodemographic information (See Appendix B).   
RESULTS 
  We analyzed our data using a random effects panel Tobit model to account for the 
dependence between outcomes from the same dyads over the nine rounds of negotiation 
and the limited ranges of outcomes resulting from the utilization of our payoff charts. Our 
Tobit model assumes that there is an unobserved latent variable, y$z∗ , which denotes the 
participant *’s true payoff from negotiation round . This variable, y$z∗ , linearly depends 
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on the explanatory variables. Moreover, the random effects (w$) are independent and 
identically distributed (i.i.d.) following a normal distribution with mean zero and variance 
of {|& and the error term (($z) is also i.i.d. with mean zero and variance of {}&. The 
following equation describes our main econometric model: 
 
y$z∗ = % + %RPower + %BPower + %Audit + %Analytic + %RPower ∗ Audit 
+%RPower ∗ Analytic + %BPower ∗ Audit + %BPower ∗ Analytic + w$ + ($z , 
 
where RPower and BPower are dummy variables indicating the three power condition 
(i.e. RPower equals one when retailer has relative power; BPower equals one when 
power is balanced between the two parties; supplier-powered conditions are used as the 
baseline), Audit is a binary variable that takes one for inventory audit service, and 
Analytic is a binary variable equals to one for sales analytics service. We used STATA 
14.1’s xttobit command with robust estimations of standard errors using the bootstrapping 
method to analyze the results from our experiment. After briefly discussing the 
characteristics of our participants, we present our main results. 
Participant Characteristics 
In order to ensure proper randomization of participants into the roles of supplier 
and retailer, we tested for significant differences in their sociodemographic profiles. 
Overall, participants who took the role of suppliers and those who took the role of 
retailers were not significantly different from each other regarding socio-demographics 
variables including age, gender, nationality, ethnicity, and test scores. We concluded that, 
overall our participants were properly randomized into the two roles.  
(65) 
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Table 6 
Participant Characteristics 
  Supplier Retailer T-test* 
  Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. P-value 
Age 22.670 4.411 22.211 3.248 0.952 
Female 0.474 0.500 0.395 0.489 0.413 
U.S. Born 0.671 0.470 0.671 0.470 0.863 
White 0.618 0.486 0.553 0.498 0.412 
Hispanic 0.105 0.307 0.105 0.307 1.000 
Native 0.013 0.114 0.000 0.000 1.000 
African 0.000 0.000 0.053 0.223 1.000 
Asian 0.263 0.441 0.289 0.454 0.718 
Other 0.053 0.223 0.013 0.114 1.000 
SAT 1801.852 261.065 1706.632 351.497 0.535 
ACT 26.705 3.598 27.452 3.217 0.498 
* Two-tailed t-test was conducted assuming unequal variances. Observations two 
standard deviations away from the means were excluded from the analyses.   
 
Individual Payoffs from the Bargaining Experiments 
Since we are interested in how structural power and service concessions influence 
bargaining outcomes, we combined payoffs from the two bargaining parameters, the 
wholesale price and the share of shrinkage, to construct a bargainer’s total payoff from 
the negotiation. As we anticipated, participants did make tradeoffs between the two 
parameters in order to reach agreements. Overall, there was a statistically significant 
negative correlation coefficient (-0.321 at α=0.05 level) between the payoffs from the two 
parameters. According to this coefficient, there was a 10 cent decrease in the wholesale 
price associated with a 3.21% increase in the retailer’s share of shrinkage (See Figure 7 
below). 
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Figure 7. Relationship between Wholesale Price and Shrink Payoff 
Since the range of possible dollar payoffs was different for the suppliers and the 
retailers (See Table 7), we used a normalized measure of total payoffs as our dependent 
variable in the subsequent analyses. Therefore, our dependent variable, Total Payoff (%), 
runs between 0 and 1, denoting how far a bargainer’s earned payoff is from the lowest 
possible payoff (or how close it is to the highest possible payoff).  
Table 7 
Summary of Total Payoff ($) 
Total Payoff ($)  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Supplier $67,631.22 $8,592.88 $29,869 $99,769 
Retailer $86,543.77 $6,978.73 $68,848 $114,920 
 
Impact of Relative Structural Power 
We first examined the impact of relative structural power on the bargainer’s total 






2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.8
Wholesale Price ($)
95% CI Retailer's Share of Shrink (%)
  102 
literature, a bargainer’s relative power dominance had a significant and negative impact 
on its counterpart’s payoff (Dahl, 1957; El-Ansary and Stern, 1972; Emerson, 1962; 
Gaski, 1984; Wilemon, 1972). On average, a supplier’s total payoff was 3.6% farther 
from the highest possible outcome he could earn when the retailer had more power 
compared to the case when the supplier had more power. Similarly, a retailer’s total 
payoff was 3.1% closer to the highest possible outcome when he had more power 
compared to the case when the supplier had more power. Our results are consistent with 
the extant literature regarding the role of relative power in that the party with higher 
relative power appropriates a larger share of the overall benefits available from the 
negotiation (Friedkin, 1986; Casciaro and Piskorski, 2005). Hypothesis 1 is thus 
supported.  
Table 8 
Impact of Structural Power on Total Payoff 
  Supplier’s Total Payoff (%) Retailer’s Total Payoff (%) 
  
Coefficien
t Std. Err. P-value 
Coefficien
t Std. Err. P-value 
Retailer-
Powered -0.036 0.009 0.000 0.031 0.010 0.002 
Power-
Balanced -0.017 0.011 0.111 0.020 0.013 0.108 
Constant 0.643 0.013 0.000 0.367 0.014 0.000 
 
      
N 675     675     




Log likelihood 441.467     413.719     




  103 
Impact of Service Concession 
To test how the supplier’s provision of an independent but relevant service as a 
concession influences the bargaining outcomes, we added six variables to the models in 
Table 8, including two dummy variables indicating the provision of inventory audit and 
analytics report services as well as four interaction terms between structural power and 
the service concession terms. Inclusion of the interaction terms is necessary to test the 
second set of Hypotheses 2 because the effects of services is contingent on the relative 
level structural power between the negotiating parties.  
Interestingly, after we added the service concessions terms along with the 
interaction terms, the direct effects of structural power on the bargaining outcome shown 
in Table 8 disappeared for both the supplier’s and the retailer’s payoffs. In turn, the direct 
effect we obtained for inventory audit services was positive and statistically significant. 
The effect of structural power remained significant only in its interaction terms.  
Specifically, when the relative structural power favored the supplier, suppliers 
could improve their total payoff by 6.5% by offering inventory audit services as a 
concession compared to the case when no service is offered. However, such effect was 
significantly attenuated by the retailer’s relative power. That is, when the relative 
structural power favored the retailer (or when the power is balanced), the net 
improvement of supplier’s payoff induced by the inventory audit service was only 1.7%. 
Nevertheless, the overall effect of inventory audit service on the supplier’s payoff was 
positive and significant, supporting Hypothesis 2b. 
Similarly, offering inventory audit service significantly reduced the retailer’s 
payoff (β= -0.073, p<0.001). However, the retailer’s relative power neutralized the 
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impact of inventory audit service on his total payoff (β= 0.055, p=0.025). Introducing 
analytics report service did not influence the bargainers’ total payoff directly nor 
indirectly by interacting with structural power. Overall, our findings support the S-D 
logic’s view of service concession making. However, specific choices of service 
concession do seem to matter as well.  
Table 9 
Impact of Structural Power and Service Concession on Total Payoff 
  Supplier’s Total Payoff (%) 
Retailer’s Total Payoff 
(%) 
  Coeff. S.E. P-value Coeff. S.E P-value 
Retailer-Powered -0.018 0.011 0.300 0.006 0.015 0.733 
Power-Balanced -0.008 0.012 0.645 0.013 0.013 0.482 
Inventory Audit 0.065 0.017 0.000 -0.073 0.017 0.000 
Analytics Report 0.003 0.015 0.871 -0.020 0.017 0.266 
Retailer-Powered  
x Inventory Audit -0.048 0.019 0.050 0.055 0.025 0.033 
Retailer-Powered  
x Analytics Report -0.008 0.028 0.753 0.021 0.029 0.425 
Power-Balanced  
x Inventory Audit -0.048 0.024 0.049 0.039 0.022 0.129 
Power-Balanced  
x Analytics Report 0.021 0.017 0.398 -0.016 0.022 0.538 
Constant 0.621 0.014 0.000 0.398 0.013 0.000 
       
N 675     675     
Wald Chi2 35.200   32.370   
Log likelihood 452.290     425.150     
Prob>Chi2 0.000     0.000     
 
DISCUSSION 
Optimal supply chain performance requires a high level of coordination among 
individual firms who are primarily concerned with their individual objectives. Power 
asymmetry in a buyer-supplier relationship, however, results in uneven distributions of 
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profits between the two parties, which often creates conflicts and prevents successful 
coordination. For example, severe inefficiencies are observed in the retail industry due to 
lack of retailers’ responsibility for the retail inventory shrinkage. While most people 
attribute adoptions of such inefficient contracts to excessive retailer power and offer few 
strategies for weak suppliers, the current study provides a theoretical framework to 
understand the subjective and manipulative aspects of power which can be influenced by 
bargaining tactics.  
In particular, this study shows, through a behavioral experiment, that service 
concession making could be a useful tactic for power-disadvantaged suppliers when 
negotiating contracts with powerful retailers. Even when the gap between bargaining 
parties’ structural and objective power is clear, the dark side of power imbalance could 
still be ameliorated or even overcame due to the cognitively complex nature of the 
negotiation process and the bounded rationality of human bargainers. Bargaining is a 
cognitive process through which bargainers select, interpret, and infer information 
presented to them throughout the course of bargaining (Hammond et al. 1975). 
Bargainers with bounded rationality may subjectively interpret objective conditions when 
they collect information about the opponent and the bargaining situation. The complexity 
of bargaining processes also provides opportunities for the weaker parties. More often 
than not, multiple issues are simultaneously negotiated with new issues being added and 
existing issues being separated dynamically to achieve the best bargaining outcomes. In 
such a dynamic process, each issue’s contribution to the overall bargaining objective is 
also changing, rendering opportunities to influence perceptions of dependence through 
effective concession making tactics. The fact that bargaining is an inherently social 
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process through which bargainers interact with their opponents by exchanging offers and 
counter-offers also provides the weaker parties opportunities to maneuver the negotiation 
towards more favorable outcomes (Kim, Pinkley, and Fragale 2005; Shapiro and Bies, 
1994). 
Among all bargaining tactics that could be used by weaker suppliers to ameliorate 
the influence of retailer power, we examine the role of service concessions. Drawing on 
the S-D logic, we emphasize the importance of the perceived value of resources which 
could be improved by bundling complementary goods with services. While it may be 
difficult for a supplier to change its resource portfolio in a short term, offering additional 
services as a concession during the bargaining process could enhance the buyer’s 
perception of the overall value of the supplier’s offerings and help the supplier achieve 
more favorable bargaining outcomes. Our results show that it is important to offer 
services that have a strong and salient value in order to manipulate the retailer’s 
perception of resource dependence effectively. 
Taking into account both the social nature of bargaining process and the bounded 
rationality of human decision makers in the context of contract negotiation, this study 
offers some valuable insights as to how relatively weaker bargaining parties could 
effectively curb the effect of the opponent’s power dominance. While the extant literature 
approaches bargaining power primarily from the power dominant party’s perspective, our 
study offers the first attempt to offer practical influence strategies for the weaker party to 
overcome power disadvantage and improve their bargaining outcomes. 
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LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
This study is not without limitations. First of all, even though the theory 
framework presented in this study implies that it is through changes in the perceived 
power dependence that the valuable service concession improves the achieved bargaining 
outcomes, we do not directly measure this perception in our study. Moreover, the design 
of the current study provides concessions exogenously thereby limiting our ability to 
measure changes in perceptions. A promising direction for future research would be to 
design an experiment such that changes in the perception of power dependence are 
dynamically evaluated before and after concession making.  
Another interesting area of future research is to identify antecedents to specific 
combinations of wholesale price and shrink share outcomes. In the current study, these 
two parameters are simultaneously settled between the two parties, which makes the 
negotiation process unstructured and close to reality but also makes it impossible to 
evaluate the influence of structural power and service concession on the wholesale price 
and the retailer’s share of shrinkage, respectively. In searching for antecedents to choices 
of shrink share, future studies may highlight the uncertain nature of shrinkage which was 
not addressed in the current study. In practice, inventory shrinkage could be highly 
uncertain which makes shrink share a fundamentally different parameter compared to the 
wholesale price. In that regard, bargainers’ risk attitudes may also be measured to 
examine the dynamics of power, risk attitude, and concession tactics in their effect on 
bargaining outcomes.  
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Proof of Proposition 1(a) 
If OPUw∗ ≥ (, 
OPQ = 3[J − 1 − :;E − :;<] + 3&0&;E − ;<&4
 − SJ − ( 
≥ 334 [J − 1 − :;E − :;<] + 33
&0&;E − ;<&16
 + 3
[J − 1 − :;E − :;<]
&
40&;E − ;<& − SJ. 




[J − 1 − :;E − :;<]&40&;E − ;<& − SJ




[J − 1 − :;E − :;<]&20&;E − ;<& − SaJn 




9J − 1 − :;E − :;<=&40&;E − ;<& − S − SaJ. 
When S = Sa, OPQ >  OPQ. 
If OPUw∗ < (, the supplier’s expected profit under SBT contracts is even lower. 
Proof of Proposition 1(b) 
OPU ≥ ( holds by the construction of the game. 
Proof of Proposition 1(c) 
If OPUw∗ ≥ (, 
/∗ = 30;E − ;<4
 − [J − 1 − :;E − :;<]20;E − ;< < 30
;E − ;<2
 = /∗. 
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If OPUw∗ < (, the wholesale price will decrease to satisfy the retailer’s participation 
constraint. However, as long as the wholesale price is positive, the optimal effort level 
under SBT contracts will always be strictly lower than that under VMI contracts. 
O;∗ > O;∗ follows since the expected shrink is a decreasing function of /. 
Proof of Proposition 1(d) 
If OPUw∗ ≥ (, 
OPQZ −  OPQZ = [J − 1 − :;E − :;<] + 3&0&;E − ;<&4
 − SJ 
−





[J − 1 − :;E − :;<]&40&;E − ;<& − SaJ 

 
= 34 [J − 1 − :;E − :;<] + 3
&0&;E − ;<&16
 + 
[J − 1 − :;E − :;<]
&
40&;E − ;<&
− S − SaJ 
When S = Sa, OPQZ >  OPQZ . 
The gap is even larger when OPUw∗ < ( under SBT contracts, since the supplier’s 
expected profit is lower and the retailer’s expected profit is binding at (. 
Proof of Proposition 1(e)  
Proposition 1(e) follows from Proposition 1(a). 
Proof of Proposition 2(a) 
Under OP,Uw,∗ ≥ (, 
OP,Q >  OP&Q  
⟺  32 [Jb − 1 − :;E − :;<] + 3
&0&;E − ;<&8
 + 
[Jb − 1 − :;E − :;<]
&
20&;E − ;<& − S′Jb 
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> 3[&JE + 1 − &J< − 1 − :;E − :;<] + 3&0&;E − ;<&4
 − SJb − ( 
⟺ 3[&JE + 1 − &J<] − 3Jb2 − 3[1 − :;E + :;<]2 + 3
&0&;E − ;<&8
  
−S − SaJb + 
[Jb − 1 − :;E − :;<]&20&;E − ;<& < ( 
Proof of Proposition 2(b) 
OP,U ≥ ( holds by the construction of the game. 
Proof of Proposition 2(c) 
If OP,Uw,∗ ≥ (, 
/,∗ = 30;E − ;<4
 − [Jb − 1 − :;E − :;<]20;E − ;< < 30
;E − ;<2
 = /&∗. 
If OP,Uw,∗ < (, the wholesale price will decrease to satisfy the retailer’s participation 
constraint. However, as long as the wholesale price is positive, the optimal effort level 
under SBT contracts will always be strictly lower than that under VMI contracts. 
O;,∗ > O;&∗ follows since the expected shrink is a decreasing function of /. 
The expected overage is θJb − J< = θ1 − JE − J< and the expected underage is 
1 − θJE − Jb = θ1 − JE − J<. 
Proof of Proposition 2(d) 
If OP,Uw,∗ ≥ (, 
OP,QZ −  OP&QZ ≥ 0 
⟺ 334 [Jb − 1 − :;E − :;<] + 33
&0&;E − ;<&16
 − 
[Jb − 1 − :;E − :;<]
&
40&;E − ;<& − S′Jb 
− m3[&JE + 1 − &J< − 1 − :;E − :;<] + 3&0&;E − ;<&4
 − SJbn ≥ 0 
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⟺ 3[&JE + 1 − &J<] − 33Jb4 − 3[1 − :;E + :;<]4  
+ 3&0&;E − ;<&16
 + 
[Jb − 1 − :;E − :;<]
&
40&;E − ;<& − S − SaJb ≤ 0. 
Proof of Proposition 2(e) 
From Proposition 1(a), we know that under OP,Uw,∗ ≥ (, 
OP,Q >  OP&Q  
⟺ 32 [Jb − 1 − :;E − :;<] + 3
&0&;E − ;<&8
 + 
[Jb − 1 − :;E − :;<]
&
20&;E − ;<& − S′Jb 
≥ 3[&JE + 1 − &J< − 1 − :;E − :;<] + 3&0&;E − ;<&4
 − SJb − ( 




[Jb − 1 − :;E − :;<]&20&;E − ;<&Jb −
(Jb . 
Since &JE + 1 − &J< < Jb for 0 <  < 1,  
3[&JE + 1 − &J<]Jb < 3 
and the reduction of the manufacturing cost stated in Proposition 2(e) is smaller than that 
stated in Proposition 1(e).  
Proof of Proposition 3(a) 
By expressing R< in terms of RE using J − ;<R< = J − ;E solving the sequential 
game shown in equation (44) through (46), we get  with the prices shown below, we get 
OP4Q = OPQ, OP4U = OPU, OP4QZ = OPQZ, /4∗ = /∗ &  O;4∗ = O;∗. 
Proof of Proposition 3(b) 
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Since SBT contracts converge to VMI contracts with the performance-based wholesale 
prices, any reduction in the manufacturer’ cost will strictly improve the supplier’s 
expected profit while leaving the retailer’s profit and the retail shrinkage unchanged. 
Proof of Proposition 4(a) & 4(b) 
Applying α = 1 & S = S′ to equations (55) through (57), one can easily check that 
problems under the risk-sharing contract converge to those under VMI contracts. 
Similarly, applying α = 0 & S = S′ to equations (55) through (57), we see that 
problems under the risk-sharing contract converge to those under SBT contracts with 
single wholesale price. 
Proof of Proposition 4(c)  
OPpU = − 3[1 − :;E + ;<]41 −  − 3Ω41 − & − 





[1 − :;E + ;<]Ωa2Σ1 − & − 
Ω
a&
2Σ1 − , − 3Q21 − &
− 
J9Ω + 2[1 − :;E + ;<]=Σ1 − & − 2
JΩ
a
Σ1 − , < 0 
OPpU  = −
3[1 − :;E + ;<]4 − 3Ω4 − 





[1 − :;E + ;<]Ω2Σ − 
Ω
&
2Σ − 3Q2 − 
JΩΣ < 0 
OPpQ = 3[1 − :;E + ;<]21 −  + 3Ω′2 + 
[1 − :;E + ;<]Ω′Σ1 − & + 
Ω
a&
Σ1 − , > 0 
OPpU  =
3[1 − :;E + ;<]2 + 3Ω′2 + 
[1 − :;E + ;<]Ω′Σ + 
Ω
a&
Σ > 0 
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Proof of Proposition 4(d)  
OPpQZ = 31 − Σ9Ω − [1 − :;E + ;<]=4Σ1 − ,
+ 2
9Ω& − 1 + α[1 − :;E + ;<]Ω − [1 − :;E + ;<]&=4Σ1 − ,  
which is positive when 2Ω > Q. 
OPpU  =




[1 − :;E + ;<]Ω2Σ  
which is positive when 2Ω > Q. 
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Round 113 
In this round of negotiation, you will be negotiating two terms, wholesale price and 
shrink share. To increase the chance of successful negotiation, you decided to offer 
value-added service to the retailer. You are going to offer free inventory audit at the 
time of replenishment, which will relieve the retailer from conducting the audit himself. 
In order to offer the service, you will incur the additional effort. The following table 
shows your payoff which depends on the terms you agree to. Your total payoff is the sum 
of the two payoffs. For example, if you and the retailer agree to choose options A & K, 
then your payoff will be $90,168-$2,445=$87,723; if agree to choose options I & Q, then 
your payoff will be $61,880-$26,454=$35,426. You are free to choose any options as 
long as your partner agrees. 
Note: Shrink share refers to the % of shrink the retailer assumes. So you want 
shrink share to be high. 
 
Wholesale 
Unit Price Your Payoff   
Shrink Share 
by Retailer Your Payoff 
A $2.77 $90,168  J 100% $0  
B $2.73 $86,632  K 87.5% $-2,445  
C $2.69 $83,096  L 75% $-5,335  
D $2.65 $79,560   M 62.5% $-8,670  
E $2.61 $76,024   N 50% $-12,449  
F $2.57 $72,488   O 37.5% $-16,673  
G $2.53 $68,952   P 25% $-21,341  
H $2.49 $65,416   Q 12.5 % $-26,454  
I $2.45 $61,880   R 0% $-32,011  
 
Circle your final negotiation outcomes. The agreement will be verified by checking 
your opponent’s choices. 
 
Payoffs if no agreements made on both within 3 min.: 
You earn $0 
The retailer earns $40,000 
 
                                                           
13
 This is an example of a single round where the supplier offers inventory audit service and the 
retailer has relative power. There are eight more of rounds with different service and power 
conditions. Note that the payoff chart does not change over the nine rounds. However, the retailer 
and the supplier have different payoff chart. This particular example is for the supplier. 
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For the following questions, check or fill in the answers which best describe you. 
 
How old are you?  ______years 
 
What is your gender?    Female ______ Male ______  
 
Are you a… (Mark the box next to the highest level of education you have 
completed.) 
 
Undergraduate student    ______               
Graduate student     ______               
 
Were you born in the U.S.?  
 
YES _____ NO _____ 
 
If you were not born in the U.S., which of the following answers applies? 
__ I have lived in the U.S. for less than 5 years   
__ I have lived in the U.S. for 5 to 10 years  
__ I have lived in the U.S. for more than 10 years   
Are you a U.S. citizen?   
 
YES  ______     NO ______     
 
If not, what country are you a citizen of? _______________________ 
 
What is the primary language you speak at home?    
__________________________ 
 
What is your race?  
 
White   ______            African American  ______      
Hispanic   ______ Asian/Pacific Islander ______ 
Native American ______ Other    ______ 
 
What is your SAT or ACT test score? 
 SAT _____ ACT ______can’t remember ____ never had to take either test _____ 
 
